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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law: Constitutional Law: Delegation of legislative
powers to administrative agency.-A Wisconsin statute provides for the
appointment of a trade practice examiner who shall issue by order such
"standards" as are "necessary or convenient" to eliminate unfair trade prac-
tices in various fields. Violation of a "standard" promulgated pursuant to
the act is punishable by fine and imprisonment. 1 The Examiner issued
"standards" for the barber trade regulating, among other things, licensing,
hours and rates of pay, hours of opening and dosing, and minimum prices
to be charged for various barbering services. 2  The state of Wisconsin
sought to have the defendant enjoined from operating his barber shop with-
out a license and from violating the "trade practice standards" so issued by
the Examiner. A dismissal of the complaint was affirmed on the ground
that the promulgation of these "standards" was an unconstitutional exercise of
a non-delegable legislative power. State v. Neveau, 294 N. W. 796 (Wis.
1940).
It is an established maxim of constitutional law that "the power con-
ferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that depart-
ment to any other body or authority."3 This maxim is based on the theory
of the separation of powers in the tri-partite governmental system and it has
been pointed out that to consider it merely as an extension of the rule of
agency delegata potestas .non potest delegari would be erroneous. 4 Although
most courts still pay lip service to the doctrine of the non-delegability of
legislative powers, expansion of the operations of government has been
accompanied by expansion of the limits of permissible delegation of legis-
lative power to administrative bodies.5
iWIs. STAT. (1939) § 100.205 (1) (a) (d).
2 State v. Neaveu, 294 N. W. 796, 805 (Wis. 1940).
•COOLEY, CONSTrTUTIONAL LIxrrATioNs (8th ed. 1927) § 224.4Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Not; Potdst Delegari, (1929) 14 CORNELL
L. Q. 168; Note (1940) 25 IoWA L. Rav. 812.5Practically all of the decisions adhere to the fiction that what Congress is dele-
gating is the "power to fill in details" or to make "administrative regulations", but
is not actually delegating legislative power. See United States v. Shreveport Grain
and Elevator Company, 287 U. S. 77, 53 Sup. Ct. 42 (1932) ; Red "C" Oil Company
v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380, 394, 32 Sup. Ct. 152 (1912); Radio Commission
v. Nelson Brothers Company, 289 U. S. 266, 279, 53 Sup. Ct. 627 (1933). See also
Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, infra note 12; Schechter v. United States, infra
note 13. Logically, however, it seems clear that every administrative regulation whose
violation is punishable by fine or imprisonment is the exercise of the legislative func-
tion. If rate fixing by a legislature is a "law", then why isn't rate fixing by a com-
mission equally a "law"? This thesis is admirably developed in a learned opinion
by Mr. Justice Rosenberry in State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Burean v. Whitman,
196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1928). It is suggested therein that modification of the
doctrines of separation and non-delegation of powers is needed. If we realize that
overlapping of departmental functions is necessary and inevitable, and all the depart-
ments guard against over-concentration of power in any one, then a more symmetrical
development of the law will be possible. By reaoguizing the power of administrative
agencies to legislate (they do it anyway), there would be no loss of control over
them. Checks on abuse of their power would still remain since (1) each agency must
conform to the statute which grants its power, and (2) the "legislation" of the adminis-
trative body must be fair and equitable-not oppressive and unreasonable. See Dicey,
Development of Administrative Law in England, (1915) 31 LA. QUARTFRLY REv. 151.
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While it is true that each state court must interpret its own constitution
and that the United States Supreme Court will not decide whether a par-
ticular delegation infringes on the separation of powers within the state,6
it is equally true that the state courts apply the federal decisions because
state constitutions in the main are modeled after our federal Constitution.
7
In Wisconsin, development of the standards controlling delegability has paral-
leled the development in the Supreme Court.
From the early case of The Brig Aurora,8 the federal decisions have
gradually broadened the rules controlling the constitutionality of a dele-
gation of power. First it was held that so long as Congress set the policy
in the enacted statute, it would not be deemed an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power if enforcement was made to depend on an act of the
President based on a finding of fact.9 With the increasing complexity of
government, the courts found that if the legislature furnished the general
provisions, and clearly defined the limits of the statute, it might constitu-
tionally allow an administrative officer to declare the specific rules and
regulations. 10 In 1928 it was decided that, so long as the legislative act
laid down an "intelligible principle" to which the administrator is directed
to conform, there would be no forbidden delegation of legislative power."
Prior to Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan' 2 and A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States,'3 in no instance had the United States Supreme
Court declared the delegation of power to issue rules and regulations void
as an improper delegation of legislative power.14 Professor Corwin had
been led to declare:
"Congress is enabled to delegate its powers whenever it is necessary
and proper to do so in order to exercise them effectively."' 2
The two N.R.A. cases' 6 declared that authorizing the President to approve
and promulgate "codes of fair competition" constituted an unconstitutional
delegation of authority; but those decisions cannot be said to have greatly
limited the power of delegation. The Court expressly recognized that broad
powers of administrative regulation may be delegated. It stated, however,
6Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 57 Sup. Ct. 549 (1937).7Compare Art. IV, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution with U. S. CONST. Art. I,
§ 1. See In re Petition of State ex rel. Attorney General, 220 Wis. 25, 264 N. W.
633 (1936); State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472,
220 N. W. 929 (1928).
87 Cranch 382 (U. S. 1812).
9The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (U. S. 1812); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12
Sup. Ct. 495 (1891).
' 0 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480 (1910) (Secretary of
Agriculture to make rules and regulations concerning use and occupancy of forests);
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367 (1907) (Secretary
of War empowered to order removal of unreasonable obstructions over waterways);
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903) (Secretary of the
Treasury may set up standards of purity and quality for imported tea).
"1Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409, 48 Sup. Ct. 348 (1928).
12293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
13295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837' (1935).
' 4Duff and Whiteside, supra note 4; Notes (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 66, (1933) 47
HARv. L. REV. 85, 95.
1 5 CoRwIN, TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934) 145.
16Supra notes 12 and 13.
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that there must be a legislative statement of policy sufficiently definite to
prevent the exercise of pure discretion on the part of the administrative body.
.. . we look to the statute to see whether the Congress has declared
a policy with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up
a standard for the President's action; whether the Congress has re-
quired any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority
to enact the prohibition.
'17
Just how definite the standards the legislature must set up are to be is not
indicated. In the N.R.A. cases they were not sufficiently definite. Each
subsequent statute, however, has had to meet this test: How definite are
the policies and standards within which the administrative agency may make
rules ?18
Contrary to the development in the Supreme Court, early decisions are to
be found in Wisconsin,' 9 as in other states,20 declaring acts of the legislature
void for improperly delegating legislative power. In all other respects,
Wisconsin development of the rules of delegability has been similar to that
of the Supreme Court, the Wisconsin courts frequently citing the Supreme
Court decisions with approval. At first, delegation by the state legislature
was strictly confined to delegating the power to ascertain a fact which
would start the operation of a statute;21 then it was recognized that if the
legislative act provided a general scheme an administrative body could
be allowed to "provide the details" ;22 and next it was held that all the
legislature need do is lay down a standard to guide the administrative body.23
After Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and Schechter v. United States, a
leading Wisconsin case approved those decisions and held the standard there-
in enunciated applicable to delegations of power by the state legislature.
2 4
In applying those rules the Wisconsin court has since held the following
statutes to be definite standards, under which delegation of code making
authority in two instances and delegation of authority to levy an assessment
in a third were held constitutional:
17Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 415, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
15 See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533, 574, 59 Sup. Ct. 993 (1939);
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 15, 59 Sup. Ct. 379 (1939). 'It has been indicated
that perhaps delegation of power to legislate concerning foreign affairs may be made
more freely than if the resultant rules are to apply to domestic matters. United States
v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S. 304, 57 Sup. Ct. 216 (1936).
19Dowling v. Lancashire, 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738 (1896) ; State ex rel. Adams v.
Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 347 (f897).20Maxwell v. State, 40 Md. 273 (1874); King v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 140
Mich. 258, 103 N. W. 616 (1905); Anderson v. Manchester Fire Assurance Co., 59
Minn. 182, 63 N. W. 241 (1894) ; Gilhooly v. City, of Elizabeth, 66 N. J. L. 484, 49
Atl. 1106 (1901) ; People v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278 (1915).21Dowling v. Lancashire, 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738 (1896).22State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 401, 70 N. W. 347 (1897); Minne-
apolis, St. Paul, etc., Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 905
(1908) ; State ex reL. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N. W. 832 (1911). But see
State ex reL. Carey v. Ballard, 158 Wis. 251, 148 N. W. 1090 (1914).23State v. Lange Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 157 N. W. 777 (1916) ; State ex reL.
Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472. 220 N.3 W. 929 (1928).
2411 re Petition of State ex ret. Attorney General, 220 Wis. 25, 264 N. W. 633 (1936).
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(1) ". . . unfair methods of competition in business . . . are hereby
prohibited.
'25
(2) ". . . [where] discriminatory, unfair, or unreasonable methods of
competition exist, resulting in unjust or unreasonable prices." 26
(3) ". . . sufficient to reimburse the state for expenses incurred.
2 7
An appropriation made with the proviso ". . . the amount herein appro-
priated shall not become effective or available until released in whole or in
part by the emergency board" was held unconstitutionally to delegate to the
board the power of making an appropriation, because no standard for its
action was set.2 8 The statute in the main case, if construed as authorizing
the promulgation of the "standards" in question, is declared unconstitutional
on the ground that: "This provision of the code [price fixing] does not
eliminate unfair trade practices or unfair methods of competition. It in
effect declares that having two classes of service is detrimental to the general
welfare. If that be true, that is a matter for the legislature.... As a whole
the code is invalid as an unwarranted exercise of legislative power. .. .
The Court here points out that the code is not related to unfair trade prac-
tices, but is a systematic scheme of regulating every phase of barbering.
If this can be done at all, it must be by legislative enactment.
The Wisconsin decisions, the principal case being the most recent, indi-
cate how the vague tests laid down in the Panama Refining Co. and Schechter
cases are applied to varying situations. It would seem that a blanket authori-
zation to an administrative body to make regulations approaching the scope
of a comprehensive code would be an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power.
Jack L. Ratzkin
Bankruptcy: Future rent claims under the Railroad Reorganization
Act.-The practical difficulties of proving damages for rejection of long-
term railroad leases and the possible need for legislative revision of the
Bankruptcy Act in this field are highlighted by the recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Palmner et al. v. Connecticut Railway &
Lighting Co.' The instant case is part of the litigation arising from the
reorganization of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Com-
pany under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.2 The debtor in reorganiza-
tion was lessee of certain street railway property owned by the claimant-
lessor. The terms of the lease provided for an annual rental of over one
million dollars, part of which was to be placed in a fund for the retirement
of the lessor's bonds, and in addition, the lessor was given the right to
25Sutpra, note 23.26State ex rel. Finnegan v. Lincoln Dairy Co., 221 Wis. 1, 265 N. W. 197 (1936).27State ex reL. Attorney General v. Wisconsin Constructors, Inc., 222 Wis. 279, 268
N. W. 238 (1936).28State ex reL. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 229 Wis. 570, 283 N. W. 52 (1938).
2 9 State v. Neveau, 294 N. W. 796, 808 (Wis. 1940).
161 Sup. Ct. 379; rehearing denied, 61 Sup. Ct. 609 (1941).
211 U. S. C. A. § 205 (Supp. 1938).
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
repossess the property on default without prejudice to his right of action
for rent or breach of the lease, but there was no covenant for liquidated
damages. At the date of rejection by the debtor's trustee, said lease had
an unexpired term of 969 years.
The lessor presented its claim for damages under Section 77 (b),3 which
provides that any person injured by the rejection of an unexpired lease is
to be deemed a creditor with a provable claim to the extent of his "actual
damage or injury determined in accordance with principles obtaining in
equity proceedings."'4  On a previous certiorari,5 the Supreme Court held
that the lessor should be allowed damages to the extent of "the present
value of the rent reserved less the present rental value of the remainder
of the term," the amount to be determined by "evidence which satisfies the
mind."6 In so holding, the Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, 7 which had affirmed the District Court s in holding that the
lessor's claim was limited to the damages actually accruing until the date
of the bar order, the rule generally followed in equity receiverships. 9 Mr.
Justice Reed, writing for the court, rejected this limitation on three grounds:
(1) Congress, by expressly providing limitations on future rent claims under
other sections of the Bankruptcy Act,10 inferentially indicated that there
311 U. S. C. A. § 205 (b) (Supp. 1938):
"In case an executory contract or unexpired lease of property shall be rejected,
or shall not have been adopted by a trustee appointed under this section,
or shall have been rejected by a receiver in equity in a proceeding pending
prior to the institution of a proceeding under this section, or shall be rejected
by any plan, any person injured by such nonadoption or rejection shall for all
purposes of this section be deemed a creditor of the debtor to the extent of the
actual damage or injury determined in accordance with principles obtaining in
equity proceedings."
The above section was provided in the Act of Aug. 27, 1935, 48 STAT. 911. Formerly,
such claims were governed by the Act of March 3, 1933, 47 STAT. 1475, 1480:
Sec. 77 (b) ". . . The term 'creditor' shall . . . include . . . all holders of
claims, interests, or securities of whatever character against the debtor or its
property, including claims for future rent, whether or not such claims, inter-
ests,--or securities would otherwise constitute provable claims under this Act."
It should be noted that claims for future rent in railroad reorganizations were made
provable in the same Act which broadened the bankruptcy definition of creditor
to include a claimant for future rent in ordinary liquidating bankruptcy. (See Section 74
of the Act, 47 STAT. 1467, 1468).4 Ibid.
GConnecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. Palmer, 305 U. S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 316 (1939).
See discussions (1939) 6 Cr. L. Rv. 695, (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 302.
6 Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. Palmer, supra note 5, at 505.
711 re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 95 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
SMatter of New York, N. H. & H. R.R.: Claim of Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co.,
U. S. Dist. Ct. Conn., Sept. 1, 1937.9 Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 198 Fed. 721, 741-742 (C. C. A.
2d 1912). See also Clark, Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Coittracts
and Leases by Receivers (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 1111.
'aUnder Section 63 (a) of the Chandler Act, 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 (a) (7) (Supp.
1934) claims for future rent in liquidating bankruptcy are limited to one year's rent.
Likewise, under Chapter XIII, Wage Earners' Plans, 11 U. S. C. A. § 1042 (Supp.
1938) a one year restriction applies. Under Section 202 of Chapter X, Corporate
Reorganization. 11 U. S. C. A. § 602 (Supp. 1938) a three year limitation has been
imposed. Claims for future rent are allowed without limitation tinder Chapter XI,
Arrangemelts, 11 U. S. C. A. § 753 (Supp. 1938) and Chapter XII. Real Property
Arrangements by Persons Other than Corporations, 11 U. S. C. A. § 858 (Supp. 1938).
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should be no such limitation under Section 77 (b); (2) the use of the
term "equity proceedings" was intended by Congress to be distinguished from
"equity receiverships"; (3) "actual damages" cannot be construed as "ac-
crued damages."
On remand to the District Court, the lessor undertook to prove damages
according to the approved measure,"' but restricted its claim to a forty
year period, being advised that proof of rental value beyond such period
was too uncertain to carry conviction. The District Court this time rejected
the claim in its entirety, not only on the grounds that the evidence of past
earnings was an inadequate measure of future earnings in this instance,
but also because that portion of the term beyond reach of the proof offered
(929 years) might have profits or losses which would upset the calculations
for earlier years. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,'12 holding that
the District Court had been unduly critical of claimant's evidence and that
the claim should be allowed for the three year period from rejection to
trial, and for eight years thereafter, using average earnings over the past
fourteen years as a basis for computing rental value.'
3
In affirming the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court contributed little of a practical nature to the problems here presented.
The majority of the Court found that from the evidence submitted by the
lessor, damages for the eleven year period could be ascertained with a
"fair degree of certainty,"'14 and that this figure represented the lessor's
damages for the entire term, on the theory that rent and rental value are
presumed to be the same in the absence of a showing to the contrary.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, was of the opinion that the damages
were inadequate, being merely those incurred over an eleven year period,
where as it was the intention of Congress and the direction of the Court
"lRental value from Dec. 18, 1935, the date of the rejection of the lease, to Dec. 18,
1975, was computed by the lessor as follows:
1936-1938 (Period after rejection and before trial)
During this period the actual earnings were used. The rental value was cal-
culated to be the earning power of the sinking fund, plus adjustments of annual
payments to the sinking fund required by the lease, plus actual operating profits.
1939-1975:
Lessor estimated the future rental value by using the average annual earnings,
before federal taxes, over four prior base periods, each ending Dec. 31, 1938:
(a) The preceding year and a half when there was 100% bus operation.
(b) The preceding three years during which there was a transition from
trolleys to buses.
(c) The preceding ten years.
(d) The preceding fourteen years.
Damages were computed by subtracting the present value of the annual rent reserved,
discounted at 4%, for a forty year period from the rental value as calculated above and
similarly discounted. No evidence of transportation experts or surveys as to the
possibilities for development in the territory or of increased operating efficiency was
offered in the instant case. See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 30 F. Supp. 541
(D. Conn. 1939), where evidence of this nature, along with segregation and severance
studies, were submitted to show that a 99 year lease of railroad property had no present
rental value.
12109 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
13 Supra note 11.
14 Citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 406-408, 60 Sup.
Ct. 681, 687, 688 (1940).
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on a previous certiorari1 5 that the damages should contemplate the full
term of the lease. He suggested that the case should be sent back and that
such damages be ascertained on "a tough business basis."
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas (in which Mr. Justice
Black concurred) likewise disapproved of the damages awarded, but offered
a more concrete basis on which "adequate damages" might be found. A 999
year lease, according to Mr. Justice Douglas, should be regarded as "the
equivalent of a fee interest," and the rejection of such lease is to be treated
as a breach of contract to purchase land. Presumably, therefore, the damages
should be the difference between the discounted value of the rent reserved
for the remainder of the term and "the actual value of the property at the
time of breach."
The conflicting decisions of the lower courts in the instant case and the
wide divergence of opinion among the Justices of the Supreme Court seem
to indicate that a concept of damages based on rental value at future dates
is not feasible in the case of a long term railway lease where rental value
must be dependent primarily upon earnings. Past earnings, even when
accompanied by expert studies of the variable factors which affect income-
producing capacity,16 can be indicative of future earnings only for a limited
period of time. Thus, an adequate forecast of earnings for a succession of
years more than nine centuries distant is a distinct impossibility.
This c6hcept, however, has been employed traditionally in determining
future rent claims,1 7 both under the Liquidating Act' s and under the Cor-
porate Reorganization Act, 19 once such claims were made provable by rea-
son of the 1934 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.20 Before that time,
disallowance was the usual fate of future rent claims2 ' unless the lease was
terminated and the claim came into existence prior to the proceeding,22 or
the lease contained a covenant for damages in case of breach, 23 or where
recovery was permitted by some theory of local law,24 such as anticipatory
breach.
15Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. Palmer, supra note 5.
16Suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas are studies of the territory served, population
trends, competitive conditions and the records of companies in comparable territory,
Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., supra note 1. See also, Meck and Maston,
Railroad Leases and Reorganization (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 626.17Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 57 Sup. Ct. 298 (1937); City Bank
Farmers' Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 433, 57 Sup. Ct. 292 (1937).
18 Section 63(a) of the Chandler Act, 48 STAT. 923, 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 (a) 7 (1934).
I9 Section 202 of Chapter X of the Chandler Act, 52 STAT. 893, 11 U. S. C. A. '§ 602
(Supp. 1938).
20Claims for future rent in liquidating bankruptcy were specifically made provable
by Section 63 (a), supra note 18, and in corporate reorganization by Section 77B,
48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207(b) (1934). The latter section was superseded by
Section 202 of Chapter X of the Chandler Act.21Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 54 Sup. Ct. 385 (1934);
Kothe v. Taylor, 280 U. S. 224, 50 Sup. Ct. 142 (1930).22Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 214 (1918) ; Filene's Sons Co.
v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 38 Sup. Ct. 211 (1918).2 3Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, 293 U. S. 307, 55 Sup. Ct. 150 (1934); Manhattan
Properties v. Irving Trust Co., supra. note 21.
241n re Mullins Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 2d 1916), cert. denied, 243 U. S.
635, 37 Sup. Ct. 399 (1917); cf. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U. S.
1941]
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But in liquidation and in corporate reorganization, claims are limited to
one and three years rent respectively.25 To such limited periods the tradi-
tional concept of damages is readily applicable. Regardless of Congressional
intent in excluding a similar limitation from Section 77,26 it seems equally
clear that the long term character of many existing railroad leases27 renders
adequate damages unsusceptible of proof if this concept is adopted in dealing
with such leases.
Unfortunately, he majority of the Court have adhered to tradition and
allowed damages on a year by year basis, employing the obvious ficition
that rent and rental value are equal in order to rationalize their position as
to that part of the term beyond reach of the proof. As a result, the recovery
does not reflect "the damages that sprang into existence from the disaffirm-
ance of the remaining 969-year term,"28 but rather the damage "from the
disaffirmance of a supposed 11-year lease."2 9  Damages, then, must depend
upon the extent.to which past earnings may be projected into the future, a
period which may vary considerably according to the circumstances of the
particular case.
The approach of Mr. Justice Douglas envisages a more practical solution,
and one whereby the "actual damage" presently suffered may be determined.
There is, of course, the obvious difficulty of showing the "actual value of
the property at the time of breach." In the normal situation involving a
breach of contract for the purchase of land, actual zalue is the equivalent
of market value.30 By reason of the large capital expenditure involved
and because the leased 'property may have a value peculiar only to the
lessee due to its geographical situationR1 it would be difficult to say that
such property had a definite market value. On the other hand, the I.C.C.
has frequently evaluated railroad property for the purpose of capitalizing re-
organized lines under Section 77 (e),32 and there is no reason to believe
581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412 (1916). For a general discussion of future rent claims other
than under the Railroad Reorganization Act, see Note Landlords' Claims in Bank-
ruptcy and Reorganization (1940) 26 VA. L. REv. 1052; Clark, Foley and Shaw,
Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by Receivers (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rav.
1111.
25Supra note 10. As to possible reasons why Congress set a different limitation in
the reorganization Act than in the liquidating Act, see Note Landlords' Clahns in Bank-
riiptcy and Reorganization, supra, note 24.26For possible reasons for such exclusion, see Note (1939) 6 Cm. L. REv. 695, 698
et seq. See also, Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad Reorganization Act (1936)
36 COL. L. Rxv. 27.27See Meek and Maston, Railroad Leases And Reorganization (1940) 49 YAE. L. J.
626, 633.28Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. &
Lighting Co., supra note 1.29Ibid.
803 SEDGwic, DAMAGES (3rd ed. 1912) § 1023 et seq.; 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES
(4th ed. 1916) § 52.
31See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 30 F. Supp. 541 (D. Conn. 1939) where
a New Haven lease of the Old Colony R. R. was held valuable, if at all, only as part
of the New Haven system. On the other hand, lessor in the present instance is a
bus company operating as a feeder system to the New Haven, and clearly might have
value as an independent entity.
. 82See Note, Valuation and Capitalization of Railroads in Reorganization (1941) 54
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that a fair value of the leased property might not be found. Moreover,
actual value might be construed solely as the capitalized value of earnings33
based on segregation and severence studies of the property over a period
of years.3 4
A third approach, possibly contemplated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter when
he mentioned damages ascertained "on a tough business basis," would be
to fix the lessor's damages at the difference between the value of the leased
property with and without the lease. This approach inferentially stresses
market value even more than does that of Mr. Justice Douglas, and for
this reason could be said to lack practicality.
If the majority opinion in the instant case becomes the settled rule of
the Court, it would seem that Congress should impose a limitation upon
lessors' claims. Such a limitation, though arbitrary, would insure identical
treatment to all lessors, and their damages would no longer depend upon
the extent to which they could project past earnings into the future. A
limitation of this nature would alleviate the injustice of astronomical claims
in cases where the leased property has no present rental value.3 5
In the absence of Congressional action, the view entertained by Mr. Justice
Douglas appears to be the only method by which the damages awarded
may theoretically contemplate the entire term of the lease.
Draftsmen of future railroad leases might well circumvent the hazards
involved in proving the lessor's damages by inserting in the lease an ipso
facto36 clause and a clause specifying an agreed sum as liquidated dainages.37
Thus the recovery would be for breach of a covenant other than to pay
rent, but the compensation would be in lieu thereof.38 As Congress has not
seen fit to place a limitation upon future rent claims under Section 77, there
is no reason to believe that this device would be regarded as a scheme to
exploit the debtor at the expense of the other creditors, and if the agreed sum
is fair and reasonable, it should be an adequate measure of the damages
actually suffered.
Frederick L. Raker
Contracts: Equity: Employee covenants not to compete after termina-
tion of the employment.- The inclusion in employment contracts of cove-
nants by the employee not to engage in a competing business subsequent to
HARv. L. Rav. 655; Spaeth and Windle, Valuation of Railroads under Sec. 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act (1938) 32 ILL. L. REV. 517.3 3Cf. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (1939),
rehearing denied 308 U. S. 637, 60 Sup. Ct. 258 (1939).
34For a discussion of such studies, see Meck and Maston, Railroad Leases And Re-
organization (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 626.
35See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., mpra note 31.
86See Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, supra note 23; Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, supra
note 22.
VrIbid.
3sCf. In re Radio-Keith Orpheum Corp. (S. D. N. Y. 1935) (unreported) (where such




the termination of the master-servant relationship' is no modern device, for
at the turn of the fifteenth century they were already a fruitful source of
litigation.2 The early common law unequivocally declared such negative
covenants to be absolute nullitiesS But the introduction into England of
the doctrine of laissez-faire, along with other factors, notably the Industrial
Revolution,4 turned the scales of eighteenth century public policy in favor
of upholding restraints when voluntarily accepted by the employee. 5
It was the contention of the laissez-faire and utilitarian schools that the
universal solvent for all social and economic problems was absolute free-
dom of contract, embracing all party-to-party relationships, including that
of employer-employee. 6  Modern courts and legislatures, however, aware of
the social injuries flowing from this doctrine, have recognized the necessity
of limiting freedom of contract between master and servant.7 Out of this
'Restrictive covenants normally fall into two broad categories: (1) those stipulating
that the employee will not accept employment with others during the term of the
employment and (2) those providing that the servant will not enter a competing en-
deavor after the termination of the employment. These classes are not mutually ex-
clusive, however, since it is quite possible to "draw a restrictive agreement effective
both during and after the period of hire.
It is frequently stated that the employee affected by category "1" always possesses
unusual or "unique' qualities whereas this is never true of an employee who agrees to
a covenant falling within division "2". Carpenter, The Validity of Contracts Not To
Compete (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 244, 266 and cases cited therein. It is also main-
tained that the granting or withholding of an injunction in the instance of covenant "1"
depends entirely on whether the defendant is of unique caliber. Carpenter, id., and cases
cited therein. These generalizations do not have universal validity, however, and it is
neither improper nor rare for a court to enjoin a defendant of ordinary capabilities
although the contract be of type "1". Columbia College v. Tunberg, 64 Wash. 19, 116
Pac. 280 (1911).
Uniqueness is not the sine qua non of relief in category "1" nor should it be com-
pletely disregarded as a criterion of relief in class "2". It is merely one of many factors
to be considered in measuring the degree of competition in either case or in a com-
bination of agreements "1" and "2". An injunction (properly limited in scope) will
and should be issued whether the contract be of type "1" or "2" or in combination if the
plaintiff can prove: (a) unfair competition by the defendant and (b) inadequacy of
legal remedy (usually because damages are unascertainable and speculative) resulting
from a breach of the negative covenant. Cf. Stevens, Involuntary Servitude By Injunc-
tion (1921) 6 CORNELL L. Q. 235, 266; see also Note (1936) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 246.2Carpenter, The Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, supra note 1.3Anonymous, Y. B. 2 Hen. v. pl. 26 (1415); Note (1928) 28 COL. L. Rav. 81.4With the Industrial Revolution, the scarcity of human labor, originally caused by
the Great Plague, decreased, thereby lessening the importance of workingmen to the
state. Further, modern modes of migration were introduced, and new trades were
more easily learned so that the possibility that the enforcement of a restrictive covenant
would cause the employee to become a charge on the state was considerably reduced.5Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181 (1711) was the first decision to so hold. See
discussion in Gare, Covenants in Restraint of Trade (1935), London.6See opinion of Sir George Jessel in Printing Co. v. Sampson, 19 Eq. Cas. L. R. 462,
465 (1865) : "If there is one thing more than any other which public policy requires it
is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting, and that contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held
good and shall be enforced by courts of justice." For brief discussion of the laissez-faire
and utilitarian schools and the thinkings of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, and John
Stuart Mill. cf. Williston, Freedom of Contract (1921) 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365.7The modern approach is well stated in Children's Hospital v. Adkins, 261 U. S.
525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1921). "Our statutes against monopoly and against combinations
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new approach has emerged the proposition which has since been the founda-
tion of both American and English decisions: Those restraints reasonably
necessary for the protection of the employer's business will be upheld.8
Naturally, the core of the problem is the word reasonable, the determinants
being time, place, and circumstance.9
New England Tree Expert Co. Inc. v. Russell, 28 N. E. (2d) 997 (Mass.
1940) presents the issues in modern setting. Plaintiff corporation carries
on a general arbori-cultural business, operating in Connecticut, Massachu-
setts, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. Defendant was
employed in May, 1937, as a salesman, apparently under a hiring at will,
since the court mentions no definite period of employment. Furthermore,
the defendant's salary was variable. On July 31, 1937, the defendant, along
with all the members of the sales force, was requested, under pain of dis-
missal, to execute a contract providing that: "If the employment of the ...
[defendant] shall be terminated for any cause whatsoever, he will not, for
a period of three years from the date of such termination, engage in any
of the New England states in the same or any similar business as that car-
ried on by . . . [the plaintiff], either for himself, or as an agent, or as a
servant. . . ." In October, 1938, the defendant voluntarily quit his employ-
ment and entered business for himself, in competition with the plaintiff
corporation. The defendant operated mainly within that area which had
been assigned to him while he was associated with the company, i., the
southeastern section of Massachusetts, and performed work for several cus-
tomers from whom he had solicited tree surgery while engaged by the
plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit in equity to restrain the defendant's breach
of the restrictive covenant. Held: That the defendant be enjoined from
engaging in any competing business until October, 1941, within all of
Rhode Island, part of Connecticut and Massachusetts.
It is submitted that the Massachusetts court might logically have arrived
at an opposite conclusion on one or all of three grounds: unreasonableness
of restraint, lack of consideration, and economic duress.
The numerical preponderance of American decisions, in the absence of
statute,10 allies itself with the principal decision in upholding the reasonable-
ness of a restriction which precludes the servant of ordinary ability from
engaging in a competing endeavor either during or after the period of em-
in restraint of trade bear witness to the uniderlying assumption of our law that liberty
can be pushed to a point at which liberty is destroyed." CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE (1928), 120. "Observation of result has proved that unlimited freedom
of contract ... does not necessarily lead to public or individual welfare ... ." Williston,
Freedom of Contract (1921)' 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365. See Pope M'fg. Co. v. Gormully,
144 U. S. 224, 234, 12 Sup. Ct. 632 (1891).
8Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 208 Ind. 245, 195 N. E. 277, 98 A. L. R. 958,
963 (1935), wherein recent cases are cited. Note (1917) 2 CORNELL L. Q. 331.
9Recent cases are cited in the Annotation to Samuel Stores v. Abrams, 94 Conn.
248, 108 Atl. 54, 9 A. L. R. 1450, 1469-1472 (1919).
101n a number of jurisdictions all contracts in restraint of trade are invalid except
those ancillary to the sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership: CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 1673-1675; MIcE. CompILED LAWS (1929) §§ 1667, 16672; N. D. Coap. L.




ployment, provided that the time and area are not greater than the circum-
stances warrant.'" These holdings, however, seem to be the result of a
failure by the courts to perceive that "competition" is not an absolute con-
cept, but a variable one. For competition connotes an interference with
either (a) actual and potential trade or (b) actual trade. An employee who
is capable of attracting the patronage of the general public by virtue of his
exceptional talent can, by the same token, threaten his employer with com-
petition "a", for the "public" comprises not only those who are present
patrons, but also those individuals who eventually may so become.
In contradistinction is the replaceable employee who is capable only of
gaining a hold (via personal contact and solicitation) on select and definite
customers, clearly identifiable. Having no grip on the public, his associa-
tion with a competing organization will result merely in competition "b",
his attraction of potential trade being at that point nil. Competition "b"
thus clearly illustrates a refinement of what the courts refer to generically
as "competition".
That an intelligent solution of this vital, modern social problem cannot be
reached by upholding a negative covenant which in blanket-like fashion re-
strains the ordinary servant from "competition" (albeit for a reasonable
time and within a reasonably circumscribed area) is recognized by a minority
of American courts and the highest judicial authority in England.
0 2
Illustrating the problem is the hypothetical case of two employees-A
and B. A is a famous ballerina; B is a salesman, not unlike our present
defendant, who is engaged to solicit and build up a route and a clientele
over which B soon gains a hold through personal contact. Both A and B
have agreed with their respective employers not to compete either during
or after the period of employment (or both),13 A breach of the covenant
by either individual would result in inadequacy of legal remedy since the
damages would be conjectural. But a violation by A of her agreement would
involve the alienation from her employer of the entire theatre-going public
attracted by A's renown, a group comprising not only those who have at-
tended but also those who would attend were the attraction to remain.
A's unusual capacities so aggravate her competition as to make it a case
wherein her employment (by another) per se causes irreparable damage.
To afford her employer the protection to which he is equitably entitled,
"lErikson v. Hawley, 56 App. D. C. 268, 12 F. (2d) 491 (1926) ; Hopper v. Western
Tablet and Stationary Corp., 66 F. (2d) 172 (C. C. A. 6th 1933); Briggs Co. v.
Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S. V. 295 (1926) ; Ward Baking Co. v. Tolley, 222 App.
Div. 653, 225 N. Y. Supp. 75, afftd. w. o. op., 248 N. Y. 603, 162 N. E. 542 (1928) ;
Cf. 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed., Williston and Thompson 1937) §§ 1643
and cases cited.
12 Samuel Stores v. Abrams, supra note 9; Super-Maid Cook-Ware v. Hamil,
50 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 5th 1931) ; May v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, 2 A. (2d) 385 (1938) ;
Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff, 299 II1. 532, 132 N. E. 806 (1921) ; Clark Paper and
M'fg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N. Y. 312, 140 N. E. 708 (1923); Burroughs Adding
Machine Co. v. Chollar (Tex. Civ. App.), 79 S. W. (2d) 344 (1935): Milwaukee Linen
Supply Co. v. Ring, 210 Wis. 467, 246 N. W. 567 (1933) ; Mason v. Provident Clothing
and Supply Co. (1913) A. C. 724; Morris v. Saxelby (1916) 1 A. C. 688; Hepworth
M'fgr. Co. Ltd. v. Wernham Ryott (1920) Ch. 1; Attwood v. Lamont (1920) 3 K. B.
371; Gilford Motor Co. Ltd. v. Horsie (1933) Ch. 935.
l3See supra note 1.
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a complete prohibition of A's entering the service of a competitor is neces-
sary and therefore reasonable.
B's breach, however, presents a different picture. B, though he is in a
position to injure the good will of his master's business because of his
personal acquaintance with the trade, is limited to this one phase of compe-
tition, i.e., pirating of actual customers (the element of trade secrets being
not present). 14 Being substitutive, and readily so, his invasion of the field
does not in itself impair the potential patronage of his former employer.
Thus the range of B's competition does not approach that of A's; and
logically, a negative covenant applying to A' cannot embody the same terms
in B's instance and still be held reasonable. A's employer is entitled to a
total restraint on her competition (the factors of time and area being ac-
ceptable); B's employer is deserving only of a covenant dealing with the
prevention of the specific evil of B's diversion of present patronage in his
former area, for B's unfair competition does not and cannot extend any
further. It is true that this result is achieved'by the general restraint imposed
by the Massachusetts court. But at what price? The cost is to deprive
the defendant of his ability to earn a livelihood for a period of three years
in practically all of New England.15 Any restraint, e.g., of the principal case,
not only grants the employer far more ample security than he merits but
also unduly fetters the employee and is, therefore, unreasonable, unjusti-
fiable and void.16 Yet the courts fail to discriminate.
1 7
145 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston & Thompson 1937) § 1446 and cases
cited therein.
15See Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 118 Fla. 137, 142, 160 So. 32 (1935): "That
courts are reluctant to uphold contracts whereby an individual restricts his right to
earn a living ... is well established." Citing Michigan, South Carolina, New Jersey,
and Rhode Island cases.
Samuel Stores v. Abrams, supra note 9; Union Strawboard v. Bonfield, 193 Il. 421, 61
N. E. 1038 (1901). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 513: "A bargain is in re-
straint of trade when its performance would limit competition in any business or restrict
a pronisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation." (Italics added). See clause (b)
and illustration 6 to clause (b) of § 515.
'0 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 515: "A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in
the absence of statutory authorization or dominant social or economic justification if
it (a) is greater than is required for the protection of the person for whose benefit
the restraint is imposed. .. .
The Samuel Stores case, cited supra note 9, was decided on facts quite similar to
those of the principal case. The defendant was a clothing store manager who agreed
not to compete, after the cessation of the employment, for five years, within any city
wherein the plaintiff maintained a business. Defendant then quit and began soliciting
plaintiff's trade. The court held the restriction invalid commenting that defendant's
injury to the plaintiff consisted only of trade diversion. Therefore, "the reasonable
and fair protection of the plaintiff's business does not require such extended restrictions.
... To enforce the sweeping terms of this restrictions would be a useless, unnecessary,
and undue curtailment of the defendant's liberty of trading." The entire covenant
was therefore void and the plaintiff must suffer the consequences because, ". . . like
the dog in the fable, they grasp at too much, and so lose all." At p. 255, citing Herres-
ford v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 7, 19 At. 713 (1890).
The court went on to say: "A restrictive agreement providing that the defendant
while connected with a competing business should not solicit trade from persons who
were customers of the plaintiff at the branch store where the defendant was employed
during his employment, might fairly be claimed to be such a restriction as is reasonably
necessary for the fair protection of the plaintiff's business."
But cf. Becker College v. Gross, 281 Mass. 355, 183 N. E. 765 (1933) enforcing a
1941]
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That negative covenants of the variety involved in the principal case are
supported by consideration is a foregone conclusion with most courts, both
in America and England.1 8 Many, like the Massachusetts tribunal, do not
even discuss the problem. 19 Althought executory contracts at will are
unenforceable, 20 it is maintained that the promise of employment,21 or the
negative covenant designed merely to prevent competition and not to prevent injury to
which the employment exposed the employer.
Dean Carpenter in Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, supra note 1, page 256
says: ". . employees should be able to legally bind themselves not to use the personal
knowledge of trade secrets and the personal influence with customers..... There is
no basis, however, for holding that the contract not to compete should be treated
as valid when the restraint extends beyond the use of such knowledge and influences.
... The employer's business may require restraints which he is not entitled to impose."
Thus the House of Lords in Morris v. Saxelby, supra note 12, in which the court
expressed the view that in cases such as these, the employer is entitled to restrain
employees from (1) exposure of trade secrets and (2) diversion of customers. "But
freedom from all competition per se apart from both these things however lucrative it
may be he is not entitled to be protected against. He must be prepared to encounter
that even at the hands of a former employee." p. 703.
Viscount Haldane in Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co., supra note 12,
was of the view that, at page 741, "A very reasonable restriction of a canvasser in
such circumstances as are here disclosed might no doubt have been that he should not
canvass his old customers. . . . But to extend it from that to the wide range I have
set forth ... is not a protection for the employer but a means of coercing and punishing
the workman."
Whether this particular division is subdivisible so that "blue-pencilling" can save the
reasonable part of a restriction which in its entirety is unreasonable is beyond the
present discussion. It would appear that in a majority of those jurisdictions which
permit severability, the covenant in the principal case would not be eligible for divisi-
bility because the clause itself does not admit of separation. Hence the entire restric-
tion must fail.. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 518. This, by far, is the better
view. Massachusetts, leaning heavily in favor of upholding negative covenants, applies
the doctrine of severability despite the absence of provision for "blue-pencilling" in the
clause itself. Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926). For
criticism of this method see Notes (1935) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 246 (discussing Warner
Brothers Pictures Inc. v. Nelson [1937] 1 K. B. 209); (1935) 15 B. U. tL Rav. 834;
(1932) 17 MINN L. Rav. 86; (1926) 40 HARV. L. REv. 326.
17Proctor v. Hansel, 205 Ia. 542, 218 N. W. 255 (1928) ; Menter v. Brock, 147 Minn.
407, 180 N. W. 553 (1920) ; Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J. Eq. 370, 22 Atl. 348 (1891) ;
McCall Co. v. Wright, 198 N. Y. 143, 91 N. E. 516 (1910) ; Scott v. Gillis,, 197
N. C. 223, 148 S. E. 315 (1929) ; Thompson Optical Institute v. Thompson, 119 Or.
252, 237 Pac. 265 (1925); Jewell Tea Co. v. Grisson, 279 N. W. 544 (S. D. 1939).
But cf. Ureka Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412 (1911) ; Duerling
v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 141 Atl. 542 (1928).
18 Clark Paper and Mfgr. Co. v. Stenacher supra note 12; Red Star Yeast and
Products Co. v. Hague, 25 Ohio App. 100, 157 N. E. 393 (1927). Hitchcock v. Coker
(1837) 6 A. & E. 438, altered the former view in England which had required that
the consideration be not merely valuable but adequate so that consideration was re-
quired even though the contract was under seal (Mitchell v. Reynold, supra note 5).
19 Duerling v. City Baking Co., supra note 15; International Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Carrington, 241 Ill. App. 208 (1926); Thomas N. Briggs v. Longi 146 Wis. 205, 131
N. E. 412 (1911).
201 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston'& Thompson 1936) § 104, pp. 351-2.
There is, of course, considerable merit in the position that consideration for his promise
can be found in the learning of a trade by the employee. There is no suggestion in
the decision, however, that such was the 'case with the present defendant.2 1 Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468. 135 N. E. 558 (1922): Bettinger v. North
Ft. Worth Ice Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 278 S. W. 466 (1925); Gravely v. Barnard,
L. R. 18 Eq. 518 (1874).
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provision for the giving of notice,22 or the mere continuance of the employ23
is sufficient consideration. With this position the civil law and a few
American jurisdictions take issue,24 and properly so. Certainly no extra
compensation is given for the servant's promise.2 5  The civil law rightly
views part of the good will as belonging to the solicitor-employee of which
he should not be divested without substantial consideration.2 6  And as for
the granting of employment as consideration, is it to be contended that if
courts were to outlaw such covenants entirely the defendant would find it
more difficult to secure a position?27 The plaintiff could ill afford to hire
fewer servants for the performance of the same quantum of work. These
restrictive covenants have all the earmarks of executory unilateral contracts
which are unenforceable by either party. 2 Furthermore, the employer can
end the contract at will and bring the disabling clause into play at any time
he sees fit-a potential means of coercion, the enforcement of which no
court of equity, being discretionary, should undertake.2 9 Certainly in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the covenant the court should enforce or in-
validate the agreement as made and not as it subsequently develops.30
Granting, however, that the court will not inquire into the adequacy of
the consideration, the covenant in the instant case appears to have been
included in a contract made several months after the contract of hire-if
any-was negotiated. This indicates that whatever consideration can be
22McCall Co. v. Wright, supra note 14; Jennings v. Shepherd Laundries Co., (Tex.
Civ App.), 284 S. W. 693 (1926).23Cali v. Nat'l Linen Service Corp., 38 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 5th 1930); Granger
v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N. W. 10 (1924); Elbe File and Binder Co. v. Fine,
137 Misc. 255, 242 N. Y. Supp. 632 (Sup. Ct. 1930).24Super-Maid Cook-Ware Corp. v. Hamil, supra note 18; Love v. Miami Laundry
Co., supra note 18; Victor Chemical Works v. Illiff, supra note 12; Shreveport Laun-
dries Inc. v. Teagle, 139 So. 563 (La. 1932); Cloverdale Dairy Products v. Grace,180 La. 694, 157 So. 393 (1934); Iron City Laundry v. Layton, 55 Pa. Sup. Ct. 93
(1914) ; May v. Lee, 28 S. W. (2d) 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).25"The employer has only agreed to pay the employee that which he may earn by his
labor . . . hardly enough consideration to make it a binding legal contract." Love v.
Miami Laundry Co., supra note 18 at p. 148.2UShreveport Laundries Inc. v. Teagle, supra note 24 at p. 566; Seward v. Shields, 9
Pa. Dist. R. 583 at pp. 583-4.27"Appellant's promise of employment . . . would not be a sufficient consideration
for the promise of the respondent." Schneller v. Hayes, supra note 29 at p. 119.28May v. Lee and Gaff v. Saxon, supra note 29.29"The plaintiffs could have discharged the defendant after one hour's service, and
he would have been by its terms, if the plaintiff's construction is correct, preventedfrom working at his business as a window cleaner for the term of one year....
The provisions of the contract are too inequitable to justify a court of equity to enforce
its provisions." Gilbert v. Wilmer, 102 Misc. 388, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1043 (Sup. Ct.
1918).
"[Since the plaintiff could terminate the contract on reasonable notice] It would be
very inequitable to enforce this contract even if the process aforesaid were secret."
(Italics added). Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff, mpra note 12, at 550.
S0"Equity looks at the terms of the contract itself not at its sequences or results.
dissent, Nat'l Gum and Mica Co. v. Braendly, 27 App. Div. 219, 233, 51 N. Y. Supp. 93
(1st Dep't 1898). "Whether the contract rests upon a valuable consideration must
be determined by the conditions as they exist when it is made, not as they may be at
some subsequent time," 1 ELLIOT ON CONTRACTS (1913) 338. Rannie v. Irvine (1844)
7 Man. & G. 969, 976.
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gleaned from the contract of employment had already been given (under the
original contract of employment) for services rendered.3 1 Moreover, the
separateness of the two engagements suggests that the covenant was ancillary
to no immediate major contract and, consequently, repugnant to a well
established policy of the law.
3 2
The third possible ground for reversal is closely bound to the inquiries
of both reasonableness and lack of consideration. If the giving of employ-
ment is recognized as consideration, can the threat of dismissal be upheld
as such in the subsequent negative agreement or be considered fair conduct
in obtaining a promise that is required to be reasonable and equitable not
only in result but in exaction ?33 Such strategy on the part of the plaintiff
borders closely on the legal concept of "economic duress", a doctrine which
has found increasing application 34 in the field of master-servant (e.g., the
invalidation of "yellow-dog" contracts and the substitution of workmen's
compensation for the employee's contractual assumption of the risk of in-
jury). Although the plaintiff corporation's dealings with the defendant do
not fall clearly within any of the categories of duress presently recognized
at law, it appears that a court of equity, as that before which the principal
case was heard, should not overlook both the "unclean hands" and "uncon-
scionable bargain"3' 5 aspects of the present plaintiff's tactics. "Means lawful
in themselves must not be oppressively used."3 6
Louis Pollack
Corporations: Methods of valuation of goodwill of business associa-
tions.-The problem of determining the value of the goodwill of a business
enterprise has arisen in several different types of cases. Among them are
proceedings involving the valuation of goodwill (1) for purposes of trans-
3
1
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Student ed. 1936) § 142: "A promise made, after a
sale or a contract of service to pay a larger price than had been originally agreed
upon [is] invalid; and generally the doctrine that past consideration is no consideration
is well recognized .and universally enforced."
32" ., no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embody-
ing it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract. . . .", Taft, J.,
United States v. Addyston Pipe Co., 85 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 6th 1897), aff'd 175 U. S.
211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (1898).
33See supra note 29. "Another instance of duress of property would seem to arise
where a seller refuses delivery unless the buyer consents to pay a price greater than
that agreed upon." Cases cited, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and
Thompson 1937) § 1617.34Llewellyn, What Price Contract? (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 704, note 49. There is,
furthermore, an element of monopoly in these cases which deserves the attention of
the court: "Suppose, however, that a country-wide business should exact such restrictive
covenants of all employees. [Here] the tendency toward monopoly might become
decisive. . . .Such wholesale restrictions would point to a monopoly purpose." (Italics
added), Kales, Contracts to Refrain from Doing Businwss or from Entering or Carrying
on an Occupation (1917) 31 H.'v. L. REv. 193; 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev.
ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) § 1652.35See supra note 28; see Love v. Miami Laundry Co., supra note 17: "[This restric-
tive covenant] is'so inequitable, oppressive, and unfair, that a court of conscience should
withhold its aid toward its enforcement."
365 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) § 1607.
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fer and income taxes, (2) to determine the value of shares of stock in an
action for fraud or by stockholders dissenting from corporate acts such
as consolidation, and (3) in an action for an accounting by one partner
against the remaining partners. It is submitted, however, that the nature
of the proceeding has not dictated the method of valuation adopted in a
particular case. Generally, the courts have dealt with the problem in a broad
way and have made few attempts to compel fine distinctions. Certain meth-
ods, nevertheless, have been worked out to afford a mathematical compu-
tation as a basis for ascertaining goodwill value.
Three methods of valuation of goodwill have received the most definite
judicial sanction: the years' purchase of average excess profits,' the capi-
talization of average excess profits, 2 and the years' purchase of average net
profits.3 Under the third method, the annual net profits of a business for
IThis is the method generally followed now by the New York courts. Matter of
Seaich, 170 App. Div. 686, 156 N. Y. Supp. 579 (1st Dep't 1915), aff'd w. o. op. 219
N. Y. 634, 114 N. E. 1083 (1916) (valuation of shares of holder dissenting to a
consolidation) ; lit re Demarest's Estate, 157 N. Y. Supp. 653 (Surr. Ct. 1914) (trans-
fer tax on corporate shares); Von Au v. Magenheimer, 115 App. Div. 84, 100 N. Y.
Supp. 659 (2d Dep't 1906) (action for fraud in sale of stock) ; id., 126 App. Div. 257,
110 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't 1908) aff'd w. o. op. 196 N. Y. 510, 89 N. E. 1114
(1909) ; It re Wirth's Estate, 119 Misc. 736, 197 N. Y. Supp. 365 (Surr. Ct. 1922) (trans-
fer .tax on corporate shares) ; CASTENHOLZ, AUDITING PROCEDURE (1931) 92-93; DAY,
ACCOUNTING PRACTICE (1924) 81-82; 1 FINNEY, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (1937)
312; JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (1937) 528; KESTER, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING
(3rd ed. 1933) 387-389; 1 LANGER, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE (1933)
278-279; MCKINSEY AND NOBLE, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (2d ed. 1939) 403; PICKLES,
ACCOUNTANCY (1934) 939; HYDER, VALUATION OF LEASEHOLDS AND GOODWILL, (1926)
19; LAWYER AND BANKER 101. This method was approved of in Ahlenius v. Bunn &
Humphreys, Inc., 358 Ill. 155, 192 N. E. 824 (1934). See also Pett v. Spiegal, 202
N. Y. Supp. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (where detailed report on value of goodwill by referee
is reprinted and approved in action of accounting).2White & Wells Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 50 F. (2d)j 120 (C. C. A. 2d
1931) (income and profits taxes)'; Pfleghar Hardware Specialty Co. v. Blair, 30 F.
(2d) 614 (C. C. A. 2d 1929) (income and profits taxes) ; 1n re Weatherbee's Estate,
157 N. Y. Supp 652 (Surr. Ct. 1913) (transfer tax on proprietorship) ; Stewart,
Ex'r Perry Estate, 32 B. T. A. 442 (1935) (income tax) ; National Bank of Commerce
in New York, Trustee, 17 B. T. A. 1266 (1929) (income tax) ; Appeal of Grand Trust
and Savings Co., Trustee, 3 B. T. A. 1026 (1926) (income tax); Appeal of the
Executors of the Estatd of Jacob Fish, 1 B. T. A. 882 (1925) (value of stock under
estate tax); Appeal and Review Memorandum of Bureau of Internal Revenue 34 (2
C. B. 31). See also Waterbury v. Waterbury, 279 Ky. 254, 128 S. W. (2d) 568
(1939) (capitalization of excess profits referred to but not applied because of lack
of data); BELL & POWELSox, AUDITING (1938) 242; BUDD & WRIGHT, INTERPRETATION
OF ACCOUNTS (1927) 317; CANNING, THE ECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTANCY (1929) 306;
4 Cox, BUSINESS ACCOUNTING (1920) 253-255; GOGGIN & TONER, ACCOUNTING PRINCI-
PLES AND PROCEDURE (1930) 405-406; GRAHAM & KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1938) 278; JoHxsoN, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (1937) 528; KOHLER &
MORRISON, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (1931) 361; 1 LANGER, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
AND PROCEDURE (1933) 275-276; MCKINSEY & NOBLE, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (2d
ed. 1939) 403; MONTGOMERY, AUDITING, THEORY AND PRACTICE (5th ed. 1934) 319;
NEWLOVE, SMITH & WHITE, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING (1939) 293-294.31S re Hall's Estate, 94 N. J. Eq. 398, 119 Atl. 669 (1923) (transfer tax on partnership
interest) ; In re Dupignac's Estate, 123 Misc. 21, 204 N. Y. Supp. 273 (Surr. Ct. 1924),
aff'd w. o. op. 211 App. Div. 862, 207 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1924) (transfer tax on corporate
stock) ; In re Silkman, 121 App. Div. 202, 105 N. Y. Supp. 872 (2d Dep't 1907) (final
accounting by executors); Steinweig v. Epstein, 152 Misc. 24, 271 N. Y. Supp. 263
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a particular period previous to the date of valuation are computed. These
amounts are then averaged to find the average annual net sum multiplied
by a number representing the number of years during which such profits
are expected to continue. The first two methods, although mathematically
different, are substantially similar. Under the years' purchase of average
excess profits method, the average annual net profits of the business are
determined as in the previous formula. Then the amount of capital em-
ployed is found and on this amount the normal return which might be
expected on capital is computed. This amount of normal return is de-
ducted from the average annual net profits to find the average annual excess
profits of the business. The goodwill is equal to this amount multiplied
by a number representing a certain number of years as in the previous
method. The formula similar to this is the capitalization of the average
annual excess profits. By this, the goodwill is equal to the average annual
excess profits divided by a certain percentage. Thus if the goodwill is capi-
talized at 20% it is the same as multiplying the excess profits by five as in
the years' purchase method.
Several problems are common to all three methods of goodwill evalua-
tion. The first of these involves the determination of annual net profits.
On this point little legal authority can be found, at least as to the determi-
nation of net profits for this precise purpose. However, an accounting
text,4 in dealing with the problem, indicates the following procedures:
(1) extraordinary profits or losses not due to the ordinary operation of
the business should be eliminated; (2) interest computed on borrowed money
should not be included; (3) adequate reserves for depreciation should be
provided for; (4) charges to operating expenses on account of repairs
should be adequate; (5) sales effected in a subsequent period are not to be
included in the accounts of the period under review so as to inflate the
profits, and shipments made to merchants or on consignment accounts should
(Sup. Ct. 1934) (accounting by coadventurer) ; It re Schlossman's Adm'x, 136 Misc.
893, 242 N. Y. Supp. 417 (Surr. Ct. 1930) (final accounting by administratrix);
In re Ulrici's Estate, 111 Misc. 55, 182 N. Y. Supp. 516 (Surr. Ct. 1920) (transfer
tax on partnership interest) ; In re Hearn's Estate, 182 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Surr. Ct.
1917) (transfer tax on partnership interest) ; In re Ottman's Estate, 166 N. Y. Supp.
1078 (Surr. Ct. 1917) (inheritance tax on corporate shares); Matter of Gumbinner,
92 Misc. 104, 155 N. Y. Supp. 188 (Surr. Ct. 1915) (transfer tax on partnership in-
terest); It re Welch, 77 Misc. 427, 137 N. Y. Supp. 941 (Surr. Ct. 1912) (judicial
settlement by executor); In re Moore, 69 Misc. 535, 127 N. Y. Supp. 884 (Surr. Ct.
1910) (judicial settlement by executors) ; In re Keahon's Estate, 60 Misc. 508, 113
N. Y. Supp. 926 (Surr. Ct. 1908) (transfer tax on proprietorship) ; BtiDD & WRIGHT,
INTERPRErATION OF ACCOUNTS (1927) 316; 4 Cox, BusINEss ACCOUNTING (1920) 254;
CROrPER, BOOKKEEPING AND ACCOUNTS (1920) 417; 1 FINNEY, PRINcIPLES OF Ac-
COUNTING. INTERMDIATE (1927) 312; GOGGIN & TONER, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND
PROCEDURE (1930) 405; JOHxsON, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (1937) 528; KESTER,
ADVANCED ACCOUNTING (3d ed. 1933) 390; 1 LANGER, ACCOUNTING PINCnIPLES AND
PROCEDURx (1933) 279. This method is generally followed by the English courts.
Mallerish v. Keen, 28 Beav. 453, 54 Eng. Rep. 440 (1860) (dissolution of partnership) ;
Page v. Ratliffe, 75 L. T. R. 371 (1896) (sale of partnership interest). The question
has also arisen under the English Landlord and Tenant Act of 1927. See (1931) 75
SOL. J. 502; (1929) 73 SOL. J. 580. For a discussion of the correct method of evalu-
ation goodwill for purposes of death duties, see (1938) 82 SOL. 3. 805.
44 Cox, BUSINESs ACCOUNTING (1920) 253-255.
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
not be regarded as sales; (6) the inventory should be carefully checked,
certified by the persons making it, and should be valued at cost or market,
whichever is the lower, proper allowance being made for old or obsolete
material; (7) ample provision should be made for all liabilities or expenses
incurred in the period under review and outstanding at the close thereof.
The period over which the annual net profits are averaged has been the
subject of some difference of opinion. The object of taking an average is
to arrive at the profit figure which, on the basis of past experience, can
reasonably be expected to continue under normal circumstances. 5 The
number of years taken for the average is not inflexible.6 The period used
has varied from three years to fourteen years,7 although it is ordinarily not
less than five years.8  Abnormal years within the period must be provided
for.9 An -abnormally high year may be balanced by the inclusion of an ab-
normally low year.'0 The average profits, however, for a number of years
is not a conclusive index, for, in the final analysis, stability and trend are
equally important.1
The question of the number of years' purchase of profits is the same
whether the purchase is of average annual net profits or of average excess
profits.1 2  There is no set rule for the number of years' purchase.13  It
resolves itself into a question of fact depending upon the circumstances in
GCROPPER, BOOKKEEPING AND ACCOUNTS (1920) 417.
6Waterbury v. Waterbury, 278 Ky. 254, 128 S. W. (2d) 568 (1939) (winding up
of partnership) ; 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 729, n. 112.
71it re Ottman's Estate, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1078 (Surr.. Ct. 1917) (three years inherit-
ance tax on corporate shares); Matter of Halle, 103 Misc. 661, 170 N. Y. Supp. 898
(Surr. Ct. 1918) (four years) (transfer tax on partnership interest) ; Matter of Ball,
161 App. Div. 79, 146 N. Y. Supp. 499 (2d Dep't 1914) (transfer tax on partnership
interest) ; fn re Ulrici's Estate, 111 Misc. 55, 182 N. Y. Supp. 516 (Surr. Ct. 1920)
(transfer tax on partnership interest) ; Matter of Gumbinner, 92 Misc. 104, 155 N. Y.
Supp. 188 (Surr. Ct. 1915) (each five year average) (transfer tax on partnership
interest); Plaut v. Lynch, 231 App. Div. 605, 248 N. Y. Supp. 61 (3rd Dep't 1931)
(five or six year average) (income tax) ; In re Dupignac's Estate, 123 Misc. 21, 204
N. Y. Supp. 273 (Surr. Ct. 1924), aff'd w. o. op. 211 App. Div. 862, 207 N. Y. Supp.
833 (1924) (six year average) (transfer tax on corporate stock); Appeal of Hovey
Company, 4 B. T. A. 175 (1926) (fourteen year average) (income and profit tax).
8 White & Wells Co. v. Conm'r of Internal Revenue, 50 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 2d
1931) (income and profits taxes).
9 Matter of Bolton, 121 Misc. 21, 200 N. Y. Supp. 325 (Surr. Ct. 1923) (transfer tax
on corporate stock); Matter of Lincoln, 114 Misc. 45, 185 N. Y. Supp. 574 (Surr.
Ct. 1920) (transfer tax on partnership interest).
' 0 Matter of Ball, 161 App. Div. 79, 146 N. Y. Supp. 499 (2d Dep't 1914) (transfer
tax on partnership interest) ; In re Demarest's Estate, 157 N. Y. Supp. 653 (Surr. Ct.
1914) (transfer tax on corporate shares). But see Plaut v. Lynch, 231 App. Div. 605,
248 N. Y. Supp. 61 (3rd Dep't 1931) (income tax). However in White & Wells Co.
v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 50 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 2d 1931) (income and
profits taxes) and Matter of Bijur, 127 Misc. 206, 216 N. Y. Supp. 523 (Surr. Ct. 1926)
(transfer tax on partnership interest) the abnormal years were eliminated from the
average base.
11 LANGER, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE (1933) 276.
12This method is considered the most scientific since the element of capitalization of
the corporation is given its due weight. See (1938) 82 Sol. J. 7.
13 Matter of Bolton, 121 Misc. 51, 200 N. Y. Supp. 325 (Surr. Ct. 1923) (transfer
tax on corporate stock).
1941]
718 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
a particular case. 14  It is impossible to reconcile the cases.15  Certain facts
do materially influence the court's decision. The length of the previous
existence of the business is an important factor.' 6 This fact, however, has,
been given slight weight in a case where the sales had increased steadily since
the establishment of the business.17  The fact that a great amount of money
had been spent on advertising is also to be considered.' 8
In the application of the methods of evaluation dependent upon excess
profits, the amount to be deducted as return on capital invested is not
static.' 9 The determining factor is the nature of the business. If great risk
is involved, the return allowed is greater than where there is little hazard,
as in the case of manufacture or sale of standard articles of everyday
necessity.
2 0
Other methods have been presented by various authorities on accounting.
They are: (1) goodwill is equal to the capitalization of the average profits
at an arbitrary rate minus the agreed value of the net assets excluding
goodwill ;21 (2) goodwill is equal to the volume of sales for a given period
with adjustments for changing price levels and elimination of extraneous
factors ;22 (3) goodwill is equal to the number of years' purchase of the
sales averaged for a period of years ;2 (4) goodwill is equal to the years'
purchase of the past annual profits ;24 (5) goodwill is equal to the difference
between the market price of the stock and the book value, multiplied by the
il re Dupignac's Estate, 123 Misc. 21, 204 N. Y. Supp. 273 (Surr. Ct. 1924), aff'd
w. o. op. 211 App. Div. 862, 207 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1924) (transfer tax on corporate
stock) ; Matter of Bolton, 121 Misc. 51, 200 N. Y. Supp. 325 (Surr. Ct. 1923) (transfer
tax on corporate stock) ; Von Au v. Magenheimer, 115 App. Div. 84, 100 N. Y. Supp.
659 (2d Dep't 1906) (action for fraud in sale of stock); id., 126 App. Div. 257, 110
N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't 1908), aff'd w. o. op. 196 N. Y. 510, 89 N. E. 1114 (1909);
Appeal of Grand Trust and Savings Company, Trustee, 3 B. T. A. 1026 (1926) (income
tax); See 5 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 760-761.
'DIn re Ulrici's Estate, 111 Misc. 55, 182 N. Y. Supp. 516 (Surr. Ct. 1920) (transfer
tax on partnership interest).
' 6For a collection of cases see In re Dupignac's Estate, 123 Misc. 21, 31, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 27S (Surr. Ct. 1924) aff'd w. o. op. 211 App. Div. 862, 207 N. Y. Supp. 833
(1924) (transfer tax on corporate stock) ; It re McMullen's Estate, 92 Misc. 637, 647,
157 N. Y. Supp. 655 (Surr. Ct. 1915) (transfer tax on corporate stock).
1 7
1n re Flurscheim's Estate, 107 Misc. 470, 176 N. Y. Supp. 694 (Surr. Ct. 1919)
(transfer tax on partnership interest).
18 1n re Flurscheim's Estate, 107 Misc. 470, 176 N. Y. Supp. 694 (Surr. Ct. 1919)
(transfer tax on partnership interest); In re Hearn's Estate, 182 N. Y. Supp. 363
(Surr. Ct. 1917) (transfer tax on partnership interest).
19Appeal of Grand Trust and Savings Company, Trustee, 3 B. T. A. 1026 (1926)
(income tax). NEWLOVE, SMITH & WHITE, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING (1939) 293-294.20See BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE APPEAL AND REvi w MEMORANDUM 34 (2
C. B. 31).21 BUDD & WRIGHT, INTERPRETATION OF ACCOUNTS (1927) 317; 1 FINNEY, PRINCIPLES
OF ACCOUNTING, INTERMEDIATE (1937) 313; GRAHAM & KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1938) § 183; KESTER, ADvANcED AccOUNTING (3rd ed. 1933) 390-391;
KOHLER & MORRISON, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (1931) 361-362; PICKLES, Ac-
COUNTANCY (1934) 940.2 2
BuDD & WRIGHT, INTERPRETATION OF ACCOUNTS (1927) 320-322.
2 3
BROWNELL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE (1929) 126-128.
2 4FINNEY, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING, INTERMEDIATE (1937) 311; GOGGIN & TONER,
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE (1930) 405.
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number of shares.2 5 These suggested devices for determining the value of
goodwill have received little, if any, legal support.
In this discussion of the methods by which goodwill may be evaluated,
it must be remembered that the figure at which this intangible is carried
on the balance sheet of a business or at which it is figured for purposes of
a report to stockholders, may be far different from any value arrived at by
an application of one of the foregoing formulae. Many businesses carry
goodwill at one dollar and it is accepted accounting practice to do so. Never-
theless, where the asset must be evaluated, the balance sheet figure is not
conclusive and resort to an independent computation is uniformly made.
No one method can be used exclusively where goodwill must be evalu-
ated.26 If an accurate computation is to be made each should be considered.
It must be remembered also that in the evaluation of goodwill, certain in-
tangible factors which constitute it must be kept in mind. These factors can
seldom be computed by any mathematical formula. The result of any formula
is at best an approximation, which must be considered in the light of all
elements, both tangible and intangible. It is only when all factors are con-
sidered that one may estimate with any degree of assurance the value of
the goodwill of a business enterprise.
Robert S. Lesher
Corporations: Tort liability of directors and officers.-In McGuire et ux.
v. Louisiana Baptist Encampment, Inc. et al., 199 So. 192 (La. App. 1940),
the plaintiff's son, while attending an encampment conducted by a non-
trading corporation, was drowned when he fell from a boat taken by him
and others without permission. The parents sued the corporation and the
president for the son's death, on the theory that the president was negligent
in directing the boat to be obtained and kept in a place where the boys
could find it. Held: The president was not liable.
It is clear that a corporate director or officer is liable for a misfeasance
or positive wrong which he individually commits. For example, if the
president of a corporation were to assault a person in his office-whether
for personal reasons or reasons connected with his official duties-he will
be held liable. Similarly, a director or officer is liable if he knowingly
participates in or directs the commission of the tort.2  Thus, officers who
2 51MIONTGOMERY, AUDITING THEORY AND PRACTICE (5th ed. 1934) 312.26There are some instances where goodwill has been evaluated without the use of
any definite formula. National Casket Co. Inc. v. Heiner, 4 F. Supp. 351 (D. C. 1933)
(goodwill was based on uncontradicted testimony of three witnesses) (income and
profits taxes) ; Moore v. Rawson, 185 Mass. 264, 70 N. E. 64 (1904) (accounting by
partner against other partners). Cf. Boggs & Buhl, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
34 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 3d 1929) (determination of invested capital for tax pur-
poses). See also 2 CORP. REORG. (1936) 287.
lGloster Lumber Co. v. Wilkinson, 118 Miss. 289, 79 So. 96 (1918); McCrea v.
McClenahan et al., 131 App. Div. 247, 115 N. Y. Supp. 720 (2d Dep't 1909) ; Nunnelly
v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn. 397, 29 S. W. 361 (1895).2Folwell v. Miller, 145 Fed. 495 (C. C. A. 2d 1916) (president of newspaper not
liable for published libel in which he did not participate) ; O'Cbnnell v. Union Drilling,
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fraudulently make representations in connection with the sale of corporate
stock will be held liable.8 Likewise, an officer who actually directs or
authorizes a corporate employee to cut timber on a third person's land will
be held liable for the resulting damage. 4 It is no defense in such cases
that the defendant was acting in his official capacity, or that the corporation
may be liable. The third person generally may hold either the corporation
or the officer, or both jointly.5
Liability will be imposed also on the officer when he is in fact a principal
rather than an agent. Thus, it has been held that where an officer told an
agent to use a company car on a personal errand for him, such officer was
liable as principal for the resulting injury.6 Likewise, an officer, who. is
the dominating force in a corporation, will be held individually liable as
principal for the commission of a tort that he commands. Courts will not al-
low a person to use an irresponsible corporation to avoid liability in carry-
ing out his own plans.
7
The most difficult type of case is one where the director or officer is not
the main wrongdoer or does not actively participate in a tort which is com-
mitted through other officers or agents, and an attempt is made to hold him
liable along with the corporation. Here, non-participation by the officer
and lack of knowledge and consent on his part will usually relieve him.
Thus, if an officer tells an agent to cut timber on the company's land and
the agent negligently or wilfully cuts timber on a third person's land, the
officer will not be liable to such person.8 Similarly, an officer will not be
held where a subordinate employee makes fraudulent statements to induce
the purchase of land, and the officer personally took no part in the mis-
representation, had no knowledge of it and gave no consent. 9
There are certain cases in which the officer or director has been held for
a tort in which he has not actively participated or directed that it be com-
mitted. The court, in these cases, has found that the officer or director
either has consented to the commission of. the tort,'0 or actually knew that
etc., 121 Cal. App. 302, 8 P. (2d) 867 (1932) ; Beeler & Campbell Supply Co. v.
Riling, 132 Kan. 499, 296 Pac. 365 (1931) ; Haefeli v. Woodrich Engineering Co., 255
N. Y. 442, 175 N. E. 123 (1930), affining 229 App. Div. 742, 241 N. Y. Supp 896
(2d Dep't 1930).3Barry et al. v. Legler, 39 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 8th 1930).4Dunn v. Griffith, 137 So. 766 (La. App. 1931) ; Peck v. Cooper, 1J2 Ill. 192 (1894)
(president, without authority, directed negroes be put off company's cars; held liable) ;
Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen (85 Mass.) 420 (1862); Messenger v. Frye et al., 176 Wash.
291, 28 P. (2d) 1023 (1934).5Snowden v. Taggart, 91 Colo. 525, 17 P. (2d) 305 (1932) ; Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46
Ga. App. 143, 167 S. E. 119 (1932) ; Debobes v. Butterly, 210 App. Div. 50, 205 N. Y.
Supp. 104 (1st Dep't 1924).6Stegman v. Sturtevant & Haley Beef & Supply Co., 243 Mass. 269, 137 N. E. 363
(1922).
7Southwestern Tool Co. et al. v. Hughes Tool Co., 98 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 10th
1938) ; Terminal Barber Shops v. Zoberg, 28 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 2d 1928); Hitch-
cock v. Am. Plate Glass, 259 Fed. 948 (C. C. A. 3rd 1919).8Tauscher v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 153 Ore. 152, 56 P. (2d) 318 (1936); Beau-
champ v. Winnsboro Granite Corp., 113 S. C. 522, 101 S. E. 856 (1920); Parker v.
Cone, 104 Vt. 421, 160 Atl. 246 (1932).9Patzman v. Howey, 340 Mo. 11, 100 S. W. (2d) 851 (1936).
1°Williams v. Riddlesperger, 217 Ala. 62, 114 So. 796 (1927) ; Rives v. Bartlett, 215
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it was being committed by an agent under his control and took no steps
to prevent it. So if it can be shown that an officer had knowledge of mis-
representations being made by agents under his control in the sale of stock,
he will be held liable. 1 These tests of participation, direction, and consent
are held to apply in cases involving a "malfeasance" or "misfeasance" or
"positive wrong".
As a general rule, then, it would 4ppear that the courts do not impose
liability on a director or officer unless he has been guilty of some active
participation in the tort or has in some other way committed what is called
"misfeasance" or "positive wrong".12 Mere "nonfeasance"--or complete failure
to act--ordinarily will not be sufficient.' 3 An exception is raised in most
jurisdictions as to dangerous premises. It is generally held that where a
corporation is under a duty to safeguard the premises, a corporate officer,
charged with carrying out of this duty will be liable to the public for in-
juries resulting from his failure to act. The officer's inaction is said to be
not only a breach of duty to the corporation but also to the general public.
In other words, an officer in charge of dangerous premises is subject to the
same liability to the public as if he were the owner and operator.' 4
The principal case seems to have been decided properly, since it was not
shown that the president of the corporation actually participated in or di-
rected the events causing the boy's death. In fact, no negligence at all on
his part or that of the corporation was shown as the proximate cause of
the boy's death.
Ronald E. Coleman
N. Y. 33, 101 N. E. 83 (1915) (director not liable for misrepresentation in a prospectus
issued by co-directors without his knowledge or consent); Tauscher v. Doernbecher
Mfg. Co., 153 Ore. 152, 56 P. (2d) 318 (1936). As to the question of ratification see
Parker v. Cone, 104 Vt. 421, 160 Alt. 246 (1932).
lBarry et al. v. Legler, 39 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 8th 1930); Thomsen v. Culver
City Motor Co., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 639, 41 P. (2d) 597 (1935) (directors not liable
for conversion by officers in absence of knowledge) ; Tibbetts v. Wentworth, 248 Mass.
468, 143 N. E. 349 (1924).
12Barry v. Legler, 39 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 8th 1930); Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67
Mo. 256 (1878) ; Darling & Co. v. Fry, 24 S. W. (2d) 722 (Mo. App. 1930). Conrick
v. Houston Civic Opera Ass'n, 99 S. W. (2d) 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
13Rudisill Soil Co. v. Eastham Soil Pipe & Foundry Co., 210 Ala. 145, 97 So. 219
(1923); Beeler & Campbell Supply Co. v. Riling, 132 Kan. 499, 296 Pac. 365 (1931);
O'Neil v. Young, etc. Seed Co., 58 Mo. App. 628 (1894); Lough v. John Davis
& Co., 30 Wash. 204 (1902).
14Mayer v. Thompson-Hutchinson Bldg. Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 .So. 620 (1894) (Supt.
of the construction of a building liable for failure to erect proper scaffolding) ; Pirtle's
Adm'x v. Hargis Bank & Trust Co., 241 Ky. 455, 44 S. W. (2d) 541 (1931) ; Cameron
v. Kenyon-Connell & Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358 (1899); Hoeverman v. Feldman,
220 Wis. 557, 265 N. W. 580 (1936); 1 MECHEMi, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914 §§ 1474-78.
Contra: Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123 (1882); Grennauer v. Sheridan-
Brennan Realty Co., 224 App. Div. 199, 229 N. Y. Supp. 719 (4th. Dep't, 1928) (presi-
dent in charge of building owned by corporation not liable to third person for disrepair
of stairway-mere "nonfeasance'). For full discussion of the doctrine of "non-
feasance", see 2 CLARC AND SKLYES, AGENCY (1905) §§ 593-607; 1 MECHEAr, AGENCY




Equity: Specific performance: Covenants for title of vendor's heirs in-
sufficient substitute for vendor's covenants.-An owner of land made a
contract to convey it by a warranty deed. The title was to be given seven
years from the date of the contract, when the vendee had completed pay-
ment. Partial payments were made before the vendor died. The vendor's
heirs, after a decree of final distribution of the vendor's estate, sought spe-
cific performance of the contract from the vendee. They tendered a warranty
deed from all the heirs of the vendor and their spouses. The court denied
specific performance in Funk v. Baird, 295 N. W. 87 (N. D. 1940).
The court reasoned that, as the heirs took from the vendor by descent
rather than by conveyance, the vendor did not give any covenants for title
to the heirs. The only covenants that they can tender are their own. The
court refused to consider whether the substituted covenants would be more
or less valuable than those of the vendor, saying that the vendee may have
had good reason to.insist on those of the vendor.
The court pointed out further that the plaintiffs would not be granted
specific performance even if they were suing as assignees of the vendor.
Three of the five covenants for title do not run with the land,' and the
assignee could not transfer the benefit of them to the vendee.
The court's position is in accord with the general view that where the
vendee is entitled to a deed containing the personal covenants of his vendor,
he cannot be compelled to accept the covenants of a third party.2 But this
decision is not in accord with the weight of authority which makes an excep-
tion in regard to such a deed tendered by the vendor's heirs.3
Like the principal case, the cases in point do not give the exact wording
of the promise by the vendor; nor is the particular issue discussed, whether
1The court held the provision for a warranty deed to include the covenants of seisin,
of right to convey, against encumbrances, of quiet enjoyment, and of general warranty.
By the weight of authority, the first three do not run with the land. 7 R. C. L. (1929),
Covenants, §§ 49, 56; 109 A. L. R. 183 (1937).2 Steiner v. Zwickey, 41 Minn. 448, 43 N. W. 376 (1889); Walter v. DeGraaf, 19
Abb. N. C. (N. Y. 1887); Miner v. Hilton, 15 App. Div. 55, 44 N. Y. Supp. 155
(2d Dep't 1897) ; Gottschalk v. Meisenheimer, 62 Wash. 299, 113 Pac. 765 (1911). See
Dalton v. Callahan, 122 Me. 178, 82, 119 Atl. 380, 382 (1923) ; 109 A. L. R. 183 (1937).
3 Winn v. Strong, 196 Iowa 498, 194 N. W. 50 (1932) ; Barnett v. Morrison, 2 Litt.
69 (Ky. 1822); Gates v. McWilliams' Heirs, 6 Dana 42 (Ky. 1837). Accord, Barickman,
Admr. v. Kuykendall, Admr. 6 Blackf. 21 (Ind. 1841) ; Wallenberg v. Rose, 41 Ore. 314,
68 Pac. 804 (1902). Contra, Spindle's Admr. v. Miller's Exc., 6 Munf. 170 (Va. 1818).
Cf. Pritchard v. Mulhall, 140 Iowa 1, 118 N. W. 43 (1908) (where the vendee was held
to have waived the vendor's covenants by refusing to accept them without cause);
Taylor v. Porter, 1 Dana 421 (Ky. 1833) (where the vendor's legal representative got
title to the land in another capacity).
It is acknowledged that the deed of the vendor's heirs or assignees is sufficient where
the court assumes that all covenants for title run with the land. Big Ben Land Co. v.
Hutchings, 71 Wash. 345, 128 Pac. 652 (1912) ; Rauch v. Zander, 138 Wash. 610, 245
Pac. 17 (1926). The right to the vendor's deed instead of that of a third person is
waived by failure to object in time. Backman v. Park, 157 Cal. 607, 613, 108 Pac. 686,
688 (1910); Bigler v. Morgan, 77 N. Y. 312 (1879). A third person may compel
specific performance if there are no covenants in the vendor's contract. See Noyes v.
Brown, 142 Minn. 211, 218, 171 N. W. 803, 805 (1919). If there are only covenants
which run with the land, the vendor's assignee's deed is sufficient. Gaven v. Hagen, 15
Cal. 208 (1860) ; Coral Gables v. Jones, 323 Pa. 425, 187 Atl. 434 (1912). Cf. Kimball
v. Goodburn, 32 Mich. 10 (1875); Bateman v. Johnson, 10 Wis. 1 (1859) (where the
court holas that it can make no difference to the vendee who the grantor was, as long
as good title was conveyed).
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or not the vendor's covenants are personal and irreplacable. Three of these
cases regard the vendor's heirs' warranties as sufficient.4 Only one holds
in accord with the principal case.5
The decision in the principal case is debatable, for it seems that the merits
of the vendee's defense are not really considered unless the court is "inter-
ested in whether or not the personal covenants of the heirs would be more
or less valuable than those of the vendor," and unless the court requires
more complete evidence of the intention of the parties.
Although covenants for title are sometimes called personal obligions,
they are not personal in the sense of involving a continued confidential rela-
tion, or of personal skill or professional services, like the promise to paint a
portrait or to give care and support to another person. Employment con-
tracts are generally called personal, but if the deceased employer was to
have no direct supervision over the employee's work, his death does not
terminate the contract.7 The promise to pay money is there performable by
another. Covenants for title are in substance obligations to pay money on
the failure of title in whole or in part. The heirs should be allowed to show
themselves as able to pay as the vendor.
There may be this much of a personal element in the covenants, however;
that they were made with a view to the credit and solvency of the vendor.
But it seems that credit is a measurable factor. There are agencies which
do give credit standings and presumably local creditors could well enlighten
the court on the respective financial standings of the heirs and the vendor.
The court will not be involved in a comparison of credits if the vendor
has assigned his land contract, however. The assignee has a remedy in
securing the cooperation of the vendor. And while living, the vendor owes
a duty to the vendee of fulfilling his contract obligations.8
Even if the heirs' credit be incorrectly estimated, no harm is likely to
result to the vendee. The possibility of a suit on the covenants is very re-
mote, for a marketable title must be tendered; and it is only in the event
of a mistake in the title investigation that the purchaser will have to resort
to the covenants. If the vendee demonstrates an encumbrance against the
land, or even a reasonable doubt about the title, the court will not compel
him to accept it.9
The court in the instant case said that the vendee may have had good
4Winn v. Strong, 196 Iowa 498, 194 N. W. 50 (1923) ; Barnett v. Morrison, 2 Litt.
69 (Ky. 1822) ; Gates v. McWilliams' Heirs, 6 Dana 42 (Ky. 1837) (which required
the vendor's heirs to tender warranties to bind them only to the extent of the property
received from their ancestor). This seems of dubious protection to the vendee. They
miht spend the inheritance or receive little.5Spindle's Admx. v. Miller's Exe., 6 Munf. 170 (Va. 1818).6Funk v. Baird, 295 N. W. 87, 90 (N. D. 1940).
76 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1938) § 1941; 39
L R. A. (x.s.) 1187 (1912).8See Rice v. Gibbs, 40 Neb. 264, 58 N. W. 724 (1894) ; Coral Gables v. Jones, 323
Pa. 435, 187 Atl. 434 (1912) (where the vendor corporation became defunct, the court
allowed specific performance to the vendor's assignee, since the vendor's covenants were
worthless. The vendee showed no defect in title). Coral Gables v. Payne, 94 F. (2d)
593 (C. C. A. 4th 1938), noted in (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 1453, and (1938) 37 MIcr.
L. REv. 165.
94 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 923; MAUPIN,
MARKETiLE TITLEs (1907), 706; WALSH ON EQuITY (1930), 377.
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reason to contract for the vendor's covenants. In view of the nature of the
covenants, it seems no hardship for an equity court to require an actual
showing of these reasons. In this case especially the burden should be on
the vendee to show that it was not the intention of the parties that the land
and covenants be given by the vendor's heirs if the vendor died. Title to
the land was not to pass until the date of final payment, seven years after
the date of the contract. It is questionable if the vendee could reasonably
have expected the vendor to live that long. She was old enough to have
married, adult children. These facts seem adequate to shift the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the defendant vendee.
The court also said that the vendee made no contract with the heirs, which
is evident, and no contract to accept the heirs' covenants. The wording of
this part of the contract is not given. Certainly there is no clear expression
of intent not to accept the heirs' covenants. If the contract reads that the
vendor covenants to give a warranty deed, the reasonable expectation is that
the vendee wants primarily the land with a good title, and expects to take
it even if the vendor dies.10
It may be urged that the death of the vendor causes a breach of the con-
tract. There is no breach if the reasonable intent of the parties, expressed
or implied, was to provide for a deed from the vendor or his heirs. The
alternative parties are ready and able. If the parties intended a deed from
the vendor only, and the vendor dies, thereby causing a breach of contract,
it is doubtful that this is a material breach. The vendee would get substan-
tial performance by receiving the land, a marketable title, and the covenants
of the heirs. If he can show damages from the substitution of the heirs'
covenants, he may join the vendor's administrator and collect them, in an
appropriate action.
An analogy might be drawn to building contracts where payment is to
be made only on the making of a certificate of approval by a certain archi-
tect, and that architect dies. The weight of authority allows the certificate
of another architect, or treats this condition as one not material to the
contract.'1
Doris Heath
Evidence: Cross examination: Insulting questions.-On August 21,
1934, one of the armored trucks of the United States Trucking Company
was held up and robbed of $427,000 in front of the Rubel Ice Plant at Bay
19th St. and Cropsey Ave. in Brooklyn. The holdup, which occurred in
broad daylight, was perfectly staged and all the bandits escaped despite a
great dragnet flung out by the police of five states. In the fall of 1938 the
case was finally broken. John Stewart, a man of many aliases, told the
authorities that nine men besides himself had committed the crime. On
the strength of Stewart's story three of the men were apprehended, tried
and convicted. One of them, Joseph Kress, appealed to the Appellate Divi-
sion, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
1OWallenberg v. Rose, 45 Ore. 615, 619, 78 Pac. 751, 752 (1902).
113 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) §§ 796, 806.
This is to avoid an unjust forfeiture against the builders. The rule should be applied
in this case to prevent the vendee from escaping his just obligations.
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Court of Appeals reversed, principally on the ground that there
was not sufficient corroboration of Stewart's testimony under Section 399
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the course of the opinion the Court
also stated that it was error to permit the district attorney to question the
defendant as to whether he had ever suffered from a venereal disease, with-
out making any pretense of showing its materiality.1 The statement of the
Court on the latter point leads us to inquire how far the New York courts
will permit counsel to go in asking this type of question. 2
Generally stated, the test of admissibility is whether the asking of the
question will assist the jury in finding out whether the witness is telling
the truth.3
In view of this, it is not surprising to find that New York is committed
to a rule which gives the trial court an almost complete discretion in deter-
mining what questions may be asked.4 The existence of this discretion makes
1People v. Kress, 284 N. Y. 452, 31 N. E. (2d) 898 (1940). This is generally re-
garded as one of the most lucrative hauls in the annals of crime. In view of this it is
interesting to note the fate of the principals. Stewart, when he confessed, was serving
a 30 to 60 year term in Danemora for robbery; Francis Oley had committed suicide;
John Manning was shot to prevent him from squealing; Benny McMahon died from
a gunshot wound sustained by accident in the get-away; John Oley and Percy Geary
were serving 70 year terms in Alcatraz for the famous O'Connell kidnapping; Kress,
Quinn and Wallace were defendants here, and only Hughes is still alive and at large.
On April 24, 1941, Kress was arrested after an attempted hold-up in the New York
Athletic Club.2For an exhaustive citation of cases from all jurisdictions on this point see 3
WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 987.
3Thus it was proper to ask: defendant in a murder trial how he met the woman he
was living with and the kind of life she was then leading, People v. Webster, 139 N. Y.
73, 34 N. E. 730 (1893) ; defendant in a murder trial whether he had drawn a pistol
on two disreputable women in a saloon, two months before, People v. McCormick, 135
N. Y. 663, 32 N. E. 26 (1892) ; defendant in a murder trial as to possession of certain
dies and plates, People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. 1062 (1889) ; a witness in a
murder trial if he was ever in the penitentiary and for how long, Real v. People, 42
N. Y. 270, 55 Barb. 551 (1870) ; the principal witness to prove loss in a fire insurance
claim whether he had misrepresented the value of the stock in securing material on
credit, prior to the fire, Howard v. City Fire Ins. Co., 4 Denio 502 (N. Y. 1842); a
witness in an action arising out of a libel, whether he had been disbarred, Hyman v.
Dworsky, 239 App. Div. 413, 267 N. Y. Supp. 539 (3d Dep't 1933) ; see also People v.
Dorthy, 156 N. Y. 237, 50 N. E. 800 (1898) ; a witness in a murder trial whether he
frequented houses of ill repute, People v. Fiori, 123 App. Div. 174, 108 N. Y. Supp.
416 (4th Dep't 1908) ; plaintiff in an assault action questions tending to show that she
is a lewd woman, Osborne v. Seligman, 39 Misc. 811, 81 N. Y. Supp. 346 (App. Term
1903).
However, it was improper to ask: a witness in a personal injuries action whether he
had been expelled from the fire department, Nolan v. Brooklyn C. & N. Railroad Co.,
87 N. Y. 63, 41 Am. Rep. 345 (1881) ; a witness in a murder case if she were not in
the habit of having carnal connection with men other than her husband, La Beau v.
People, 34 N. Y. 223, 33 How. Pr. 66 (1866); defendant in a trial for larceny of a
desk whether he had ninety dollars which belonged to a taxi association, People v.
Martino, 256 App. Div. 406, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 945 (3d Dep't 1939); a witness in a
larceny case whether he had paid the rent on his restaurant, People v. Montlake, 184
App. Div. 578, 172 N. Y. Supp. 102 (2d Dep't 1918); A-sRICAN LAW INsTrMUTE, COnE
OF EvmaqcE (Tent. Draft 2, 1941) § 106 (1) (b).4People v. Enright, 221 App. Div. 26. 222 N. Y. Supp. 497 (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd.
248 N. Y. 633. 162 N. E: 554 (1928) ; People v. Slover. 232 N. Y. 264, 133 N. E. 633
(1921); People v. Braun, 158 N. Y. 558, 53 N. E. 529 (1899); People v. Tice, 131
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it virtually impossible to extract a definite rule from the cases, the tendency
being to uphold the ruling of the lower court. However, there are cases
holding that the bounds have been exceeded.5
Regardless of relevancy it is permissible to show a prior conviction. This
is statutory.- The witness is required to answer questions concerning the
conviction and the interrogator is not bound by negative answers as he is
in other situations.7 This is a matter of policy which has been settled by
legislation; and if the principal case is to be accepted at its face value the
terms of the statute represent the limit to which counsel may go in this
respect.
The decisions indicate that in a criminal prosecution when the defendant
takes the stand in his own behalf the latitude of the cross examination will
be somewhat restricted. It is true that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion does not arise to impede the district attorney in posing insulting ques-
tions.8  However, the feeling has existed that the defendant's case should
not be unduly prejudiced by allowing the prosecution a free hand to question
on collateral matters.9 The instant case defines the restriction in terms of
materiality.
N. Y. 651, 30 N. E. 494 (1892) ; People v. Clark, 102 N. Y. 735, 8 N. E. 38 (1886);
Langley v. Wadsworth, 99 N. Y. 61, 1 N. E. 106 (1885) ; People v. Irving, 95 N. Y.
541 (1884); People v. Court, 83 N. Y. 436 (1881) ; Southworth v. Bennett, 58 N. Y.
659 (1874); Connors v. People, 50 N. Y. 240 (1872); Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 270
(1870) ; Shepherd v. Parker, 36 N. Y. 517 (1867) ; Greton v. Smith, 33 N. Y. 245, 250
(1865) ; President & Directors of the Third G. W. Turnpike Road Co. v. Loomis, 32
N. Y. 127 (1865); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (Tent. Draft 2,
1941) § 403 provides for a wide discretion in the trial judge in this respect.
5 People v. Freeman, 203 N. Y. 267, 96 N. E. 413 (1911); People v. Dorthy, 156
N. Y. 237, 50 N. E. 800 (1898) ; People v. Martino, 256 App. Div. 406, 10 N. Y. S.
(2d) 945 (3d Dep't 1939) ; People v. Bloodgood, 251 App. Div. 593, 298 N. Y. Supp.
91 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Geiger v. Weiss, 245 App. Div. 817, 281 N. Y. Supp. 154 (2d Dep't
1935) ; McWharf v. Webber, 222 App. Div. 347, 225 N. Y. Supp. 761 (4th Dep't 1927) ;
People v. Montlake, 184 App. Div. 578, 172 N. Y. Supp. 102 (2d Dep't 1918); Osborne
v. Seligman, 39 Misc. 811, 81 N. Y. Supp. 346 (App. Term 1903).
6N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 350; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2444; People v. Cardillo, 207 N. Y.
70, 100 N. E. 745 (1912); Spiegel v. Hays, 118 N. Y. 660, 22 N. E. 1105 (1889);
People v. Noelke, 94 N. Y. 137, 46 Am. Rep. 128 (1883) ; AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE,
CODE OF EVIDENCE (Tent. Draft 2, 1941) § 106 (1) (b) would limit the right to show
a conviction in civil cases or in the case of a witness in a criminal action to convictions
involving dishonesty and false statement; § 106 (3) denies the right to examine the
defendant in a criminal action concerning any prior conviction unless he has put his
character in issue.
7 People v. Dietz, 216 App. Div. 23, 222 N. Y. Supp. 497 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd.
244 N. Y. 534 (1926) ; Potter v. Browne, 197 N. Y. 288, 90 N. E. 812 (1910) ; People
v. De Garmo, 179 N. Y. 130, 71 N. E. 736 (1904) ; Geiger v. Weiss, 245 App. Div. 817,
281 R. Y. Supp. 154 (2d Dep't 1935); RIcHARDSON, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1936) § 569.
But see Brandon v. People, 42 N. Y. 265 (1870). However, it is not proper to question
as to arrests, indictments or the posting of bonds to keep the peace; People v. Morrison,
194 N. Y. 175, 86 N. E. 1120 (1909) ; People v. Cascone. 185 N. Y. 317, 78 N. E.
287 (1906); Van Bokkelen v. Berdell, 130 N. Y. 141, 29 N. E. 254 (1891) ; People v.
Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288, 32 Am. Rep. 302 (1879); McWharf v. Webber, 222 App. Div.
347. 225 N. Y. Supp. 761 (4th Dep't 1927).
SPeople v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 30 N. E. 494 (1892) ; Connors v. People, 50 N. Y.
240 (1872).
9 People v. Malkin, 250 N. Y. 185, 164 N. E. 900, noted (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 526:
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This seems proper not only in criminal cases but also in civil actions,
and not only in the case of parties who take the stand as witnesses but also
in cases of ordinary witnesses. There is some early New York authority
which recognizes a privilege against answering a question that tends to
disgrace unless it bears directly on the issue.1 ° Not only is the opinion of
judge Rippey in the principal case supported by this early authority but
it is also amply supported in reason. Immaterial questions can be justified
only on the ground that they cast doubt on the veracity of the testimony.
Since it has not yet been objectively demonstrated that an affliction such
as a venereal disease impairs the credibility of the diseased or that a prosti-
tnte is less likely to tell the truth than a plumber, such questions should
not be permitted."
It is to be hoped that the Court will in a.future case, involving an ordi-
nary witness, give expression to the same rule. Such a change is justified
for the same reason as has been set forth in the case of a defendant on
the stand. Furthermore it is necessary as a matter of policy, in order to
allay the fears of prospective witnesses that their private lives will be sub-
jected to a microscopic scrutiny in the public courtroom.
George S. Dillon
International Law: Immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit: What
is a sovereign state?- In Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo; 36 F. Supp. 503
(E. D. N. Y. 1941), the plaintiff, suing on bonds issued by Sao Paulo, one
of the federated states of the United States of Brazil, served a warrant of
attachment upon the fiscal agent of the defendant state in the United States,
attaching funds held by a New York depository for payment of such bonds.
The issue of sovereign immunity was raised on behalf of Sao Paulo by
the Brazilian Ambassador to the United States and under the circumstances
of the particular case, as related in footnote 1, the court held that the interest
action by a shopowner, arising out of a raid on the shop which occurred during a
strike. Defendants were members of the striking union. They were asked whether
the union had been expelled from the American Federation of Labor because of their
violent activities. Were they communists? Whether their union was left wing? Whether
they read radical newspapers? It was held that the cumulative effect of the questions
tended to intensify the impression which the district attorney was endeavoring to create
-that these were undesirable citizens. This was considered reversible error. People v.
Richardson, 222 N. Y. 103, 118 N. E. 514 (1918) : holding it to be error to allow a
witness to be asked questions which undeniably went to the credibility of the witness
because they incidentally tended to show that the defendant was of a criminal and
degraded character. People v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288, 32 Am. Rep. 302 (1879) ; People v.
Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 28 Am. Rep. 183 (1878).
'OPeople v. Blakeley, 4 Park. Cr. 176 (N. Y. 1859); Lohman v. People, 1 N. Y.
379, 49 Am. Dec. 340 (1848) ; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 230 (N. Y. 1830).1 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (Tent. Draft 2, 1941) § 105 (f).
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of Brazil in the funds was such as to entitle them to sovereign immunity.'
Whether, if the Brazilian Ambassador had not interposed the claim for
immunity, Sao Paulo officials might have done so, and whether there would
be immunity for Sao Paulo if the facts did not so intimately connect the
Sao Paulo and Brazilian finances, it was not actually necessary for the
court to decide.
A sovereign state is not, without its consent, subject to suits in the courts
of a foreign state.2 The question arises then: what constitutes a state?
"A permanently organized political society, occupying a fixed territory, and
enjoying within the borders of that territory freedom from control by any
other state, so that it is able to be a responsible agent before the world" ;3
or "A 'State' is a member of the community of nations."4 The actual deci-
sion in the main case rests upon the status of Brazil itself, a status about
which there can be no question.' Brazil meets every requirement for sovereign
immunity if the latter is appropriately claimed.
'Due to the economic depression the Brazilian government, in 1931, took over the
fiscalization of all foreign exchange transactions and suspended service on its own
external debts as well as that of its several states. With an improvement in inter-
national trade in Brazil, the government resumed service on these debts under the
Aranha Plan, pursuant to which the states were obligated to include in their budgets
appropriations sufficient to cover full service of their external debts. Such funds were
deposited in the Bank of Brazil or other depository banks approved by the Brazilian
government, subject to its order. Against payments out of these deposits, the Bank of
Brazil would furnish necessary bills of exchange required to meet the contemplated
remittances and would generally remit for the account of the Government of Brazil.
It was understood by the fiscal agents that there could be no disposition of the funds
except by the directions of the Brazilian government. This service was suspended in
1937, due to unfavorable economic conditions but was resumed under a similar plan in
1940, and was in force at the time of the present suit. (This case is also noted in
(1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1088).
'The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 58 Sup. Ct. 432 (1938); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S.
Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562, 46 Sup. Ct. 611 (1926) ; Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 41 Sup.
Ct. 185 (1919); The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116, 32 L. ed. 287
(1812) ; Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N. Y. 362, 24 N. E. (2d) 81 (1939). See
also Coudert, International Law in Relation to Private Law Practice (1926) 12 CORNELL
L. Q. 13; Notes (1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 459. (1930) 15 CORNELL L. Q. 629.
3FENWICx, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1934) 86. See also WHEATON, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1929) 38. In 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1937)
§§ 63-111, the author lists as not-full sovereign states those states under the protectorate
of another state, those under the suzerainty of another state, and member-states of a
so-called Federated State. He then discusses Personal Unions, Real Unions, and Confed-
erated States which are not considered as International Persons; Federated States which
are recognized as International Persons; Vassal States, States under Protectorate and
Mandated areas which are not regarded, as a general rule, as International Persons;
and self-governing Dominions, Neutralized States, and the Holy See which are held to
be International Persons.4
RESEARCH IN' INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harvard Law School, 1932) "DRAFT CONVEN-
TION ON DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES" p. 42, and "DRAFT CONVENTION ON
COMPETExCE OF COURTS nT REGARD TO FOREIGN STATES" p. 475, Article 1 (a). The
authors' comments on page 475 are that the term would include the British Dominions
but specifically exclude political subdivisions of a state (e.g., Province of Ontario, Ohio,
Toledo, Ohio). On page 483 of the comments is stated: "It seems to be correct to assert
that the status in international law of the political subdivisions of a federated State is
not the same as that of the federation itself, irrespective of their relation to the fed-
eration as defined in the respective constitutions."
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The case, however, furnishes an occasion for examining the status of Sao
Paulo if it alone were involved as debtor and claimant for immunity.
"'State' includes the government of a State and the head of a State, but
does not include a political subdivision of a State."5 Since Sao Paulo is
a political subdivision of the United States of Brazil and lacks freedom
from control by any other state, it is not a state as known to international
law.6 What 'privileges and immunities should such a political subdivision
have? The general answer seems to lie within the option of the forum in
which the case is tried. The authors of the second definition of a state
given above comment, "No State is hereby precluded from according to
political subdivisions of other States the privileges and immunities which
this Convention requires it to accord to the States themselves."'7  The
English courts in one case held that the Khedive of Egypt was not entitled
to sovereign immunity since he was not recognized by "Her Majesty" as
reigning sovereign of the State of Egypt. Turkey, the nominal sovereign
in Egypt at that time, had not made any claim for the immunity.8 The
courts of France in another case held that the State of C~ara of Brazil could
not set up a plea of sovereign immunity when sued on loans it made in
France. 9 In the United States of America one federal court treated the
Commonwealth of Australia as entitled to sovereign immunity. 10 The New
York courts allowed one of the states of the republic of Mexico to sue in
their courts"I and in a dictum stated that a department of Portugal could
not be sued without its consent ;12 but a New Jersey court in a dictum
expressed the belief that a state of the republic of Mexico could not set up
a plea of immunity from judicial process since members of a federated re-
5 REsEARCHa IN INTERNATIONAL LAWV (Harvard Law School, 1932) DRAFT CONVEN-
TION ON COMPETENCE OF COURTS IN REGARD TO FOREIGN STATES, Article 1(a).
6"No diplomatic relations exist between the United States and the State of Sao Paulo.
Diplomatic relations exist only with the United States of Brazil. In short, the State of
Sao Paulo as a Federated State lacks 'external sovereignty'. . . ." Sullivan v. State of
Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503, 504 (E. D. N. Y. 1941), quoting a letter from the United
States Department of State to the judge in the case.7
REsEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harvard Law School, 1932) DRAFT CONVEN-
TION ON COMPETENCE OF COURTS IN REGARD TO FOREIGN STATES, Article l(a), Com-
ments 483.
8The Charkieb, L. R. 4 Adm. & Ecc. 59 (1873).9Etat de Cdara v. Dorr, 2 Gaz. Pal. 614 (1928). For unrecognized and de facto gov-
crnments the United States courts have held that although such a sovereign may not
be sued in our courts without its consent [Wulfsohn v. Russian Federated Soviet Repub-
lic, 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923)], yet, since a foreign power brings an action
in our courts not as a matter of right but as a matter of comity, then until such govern-
ment is recognized by the United States no such comity exists. Russian Socialist Fed-
erated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923). See also
Wright, The Russian Government in Our Courts (1925) 11 CORNELL L. Q. 49.
10 1n re Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., McLean v. The Commonwealth of
Australia, 293 Fed. 192 (C. C. A. 9th 1923)j In this case the claim of immunity was
made by the commissioner of the Commonwealth.
"IState of Yucatan v. Argmendo, 92 Misc. 547, 157 N. Y, Supp. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
This suit was instituted by the authority of the state governor and not by the ambassador
from Mexico.
12 De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos Do Estado, 199 App. Div. 602, 191 N. Y.
Supp. 864 (1st Dep't 1922). In this case the answer of the defendant which asserted
immunity was verified by the Vice Consul General of Portugal.
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public are treated as having no independent existence as a state in their
external relations. 13 These last three decisions indicate that the state courts
have not felt that there was any requirement, of national uniformity in
respect to the matter. The same defendant may thus be immune in one state
and not in another so long as no treaty governs the topic.
1 4
An analogy' from the position of our own states' immunity under the
United States Constitution should give guidance for courts in United States.
The United States cannot be sued, without its consent, by a state.' 5 A suit
by one state against another is allowed. But this is so merely because the
states by their own consent gave the United States Supreme Court such
jurisdiction and delegated authority in order to perfect the union.' 6 The
United States may sue a constituent state without the latter's consent-but
this, too, is a constitutional limitation on the state's sovereignty granted in
order to preserve the permanence of the union;17 and the constitutional
surrenders of immunity are limited to their express terms. The Eleventh
Amendment interposes an absolute bar to a suit against a state without its
consent brought by citizens of another state' s or by citizens or subjects of
a foreign state.' 9 The same principle stands behind the immunity of the
states from suits brought against them by their own citizens, 20 by a foreign
corporation,2 1 or by a foreign state.22  If the general relationsh.ip of the
individual states to the federal government of Brazil is analogous to that
of the states of United States of America to the United States of America,
the State of Sao Paulo remains a sovereign except as to that which it has
expressly surrendered to the Brazilian federal union.
' 3 Molina v. Commission Reguladora Del Mercado De Henequen, 91 N. J. L. 382, 103
Atl. 397 (1918). In this case the ambassador from Mexico in a letter to the State
Department suggested that the property be immune, but the State Department refused
to act upon it. The ambassador did not come to court to assert the plea of immunity.
14What the effect of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 317 (1938), will
be concerning international law in the federal courts presents an intriguing problem.
For a general discussion on the topic see Jessup, Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
Applied to International Law, (1939) 33 Am. J. INT. L. 740-3.
'5 Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 27 Sup. Ct. 388 (1907).
16Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 421, 51 Sup. Ct. 522 (1931) ; Wisconsin v. Illinois,
278 U. S. 367, 49 Sup. Ct. 163 (1928); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565,
38 Sup. Ct. 400 (1918).
"7United States v. Minnesota, 220 U. S. 181, 46 Sup. Ct. 298 (1926); United States
v. Michigan, 190 U. S. 379, 23 Sup. Ct. 742 (1902) ; United States v. Texas, 143 U. S.
621, 12 Sup. Ct. 488 (1892).
'sHagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 6 Sup. Ct. 608 (1885) ; Louisiana v. Jumel,
107 U. S. 711, 2 Sup. Ct. 128 (1882).
19In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164 (1887).20Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 504 (1890).2 1Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 20 Sup. Ct. 919 (7900).22"In such a case, the grounds of coercive jurisdiction which are present in suits to
determine controversies between States of the Union, or in suits brought by the United
States against a state are not present. The foreign State lies outside the structure of
the Union. The waiver or consent on the part of a State, which inheres in the ac-
ceptance of the constitutional plan, runs to other states who likewise accepted that
plan, and to United States as the sovereign which the Constitution creates. We per-
ceive no ground on which it can be said that any waiver or consent by a State of the
Union has run in favor of a foreign State." Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U. S. 313, 330, 54 Sup. Ct. 745, 751 (1934).
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The status of a Brazilian state in the Brazilian Federation is not definitely
expressed in the opinion in the Sao Paulo case, 23 but Judge Moscowitz re-
marked: "Sao Paulo is akin to a State of the United States which has been
recognized as possessing sovereign immunity. While the absence of external
sovereignty on the part of the State of Sao Paulo puts this court under no
obligation as a matter of international law to accord sovereign immunity to
the State of Sao Paulo, yet as a matter of comity and reciprocal treatment,
the court is of the opinion that Sao Paulo should be recognized as possessing
sovereign immunity." 24 The language is broad enough to warrant the state-
ment that if the circumstances involved only Sao Paulo as a debtor and un-
connected with Brazil itself, immunity would have been extended. EHow,
procedurally speaking, this claim would be made is not adverted to in the
opinion, although in the various cases2 5 where claims to immunity were raised
by governments other than complete sovereigns the methods used were the
assertions to the court by a commissioner, the state governor, and a vice con-
sul general, and a letter to the State Department by an ambassador suggest-
ing the immunity.26 How far this immunity should extend to other political
subdivisions of a sovereign state (e.g., a county, municipality, unincorporated
village) presents an unsettled question.
2
Edward R. Moran
2On page 505 of the opinion, the court quoted a further letter addressed to it by
the State Department concerning the status of the State of Sao Paulo.
2436 F. Supp. 503, 307 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
25Supra notes 10-13.
26A discussion of the methods of asserting the claim of sovereign immunity in behalf
of the accepted International Person may be found in RoBiNsoN, ADaxIALTY (1939) 258,
and in an article by Angell, Sovereign Immunity-the Modern Trend (1925) 35 YALE
L. J. 150, 164. For a discussion of the apparent conflict in the conclusiveness to be
given a "suggestion" (a suggestion is a scheme in which the foreign state asserts a
claim of immunity to our State Department which in turn through the Attorney General
and the United States Attorney of the district in which the case is tried presents such
suggestion of immunity to the court), see an article by Deak, The Plea of Sovereign
Immunity and the New York Court of Appeals (1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 453, and Note
(1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 459.
For the related topic of what interest in an instrumentality or property a state must
have in order to shield it with the cloak of immunity, two succinctly given summaries
appear in Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N. Y. S.
(2d) 201 (2d Dep't 1940) ; Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute,
260 App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 825 (1st Dep't 1940). See also RoBwnsoN, AD-
m lALTY (1939) 244-278; Harvey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in
Commercial Enterprises; A Proposed Solution (1929) 27 MicIE. L. REv. 751; Notes
(1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 662; (1925) 10 CORNELL L. Q. 390.27Within our own country the rule at common law was that a state or its political
subdivisions could not be sued without express legislative sanction. Clarksdale Com-
pregs & Storage Co. v. Caldwell Co., 80 Miss. 343, 31 So. 790 (1902); Brooks v. One
Motor Bus, Etc., 190 S. C. 379, 3 S. E. (2d) 42 (1939) : Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v.
City of Spartanburg, 185 S. C. 353, 194 S. E. 143 (1937). Since legislation has been
passed allowing such suits, it is now the general rule that a municipality engaging in
proprietary as distinguished from governmental activities may be sued for causes of
action arising therefrom. Eastern Union CO. v. Moffat Tunnel Dist.. 6 W. W. Harr 488,
178 Atl. 864 (Del. 1935); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. State, 173 Md.
103, 195 At. 571 (1937).
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Libel: Defamation of the dead: Recovery by surviving relatives.-In
recent years, the courts have been presented with considerable litigation in-
volving libel and slander of deceased persons. With a high degree of con-
sistency in the cases, the English courts and a majority of American jurisdic-
tions, in the absence of a statute," have refused to sustain a cause of action in
behalf of the surviving relatives which alleged defamation of a deceased
person. The sole satisfaction granted by the courts to the survivors is in the
nature of criminal prosecution.2 Diametrically opposed to the common law
viewpoint is that of the Roman,3 French,4 and German codes,5 all of which
recognize libel of the dead as a legal wxong and permit recovery in a civil
action.
Ancient as the problem is, it is noteworthy that prior to 1940, with the
4 to 3 decision in Ruse v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 284 N. Y. 335, 31 N. E. (2d)
182 (19 A), apparently no case reached the New York Court of Appeals
involving the unique problem of defamation of the dead. In the Rose case,
the wife and children of one Jack Rose, deceased, brought an action for libel
against the defendant newspaper, alleging that it had erroneously identified
Mr. Rose as Baldy Jack Rose, a self-confessed murderer and notorious
underworld character. The Appellate Division in a 3 to 2 decision granted
a motion dismissing the complaint,6 and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding: ".... a libel or slander upon the memory of a deceased person which
makes no direct reflection upon his relatives gives them no cause of action for
defamation." Judge Finch, with Rippey and Conway, JJ., concurring, regis-
tered a vigorous dissent contending that the present state of the law in New
York afforded a cause of action, but that if the New York decisions were to
be so interpreted as to deny relief, "... the matter should be called to the
attention of the legislature."
'7
I
Whether redress should be granted to surviving relatives for villification
of the dead is a debatable proposition. Cases and commentators have mar-
shalled arguments in support of both the pros and cons. Since subjective
opinions and considerations of public policy, rather than pure legal reason-
ing, underlie both of these viewpoints, only general reference will here be
made to the authorities." It is to be clearly noted, however, that in the
'Three American jurisdictions permit civil actions for libel of the dead: Illinois, ILL.
ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1941) c. 126, §§ 4-5, Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1938),
Tit. 12, § 1441, and Texas, TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon 1935) § 5430.2Twenty-three states make defamation of a deceased a crime. See Armstrong, Nothing
But Good of the Dead? (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 5229 for a compilation of these statutes.
3DIG. 47, 10, 11, under heading: De iniuriis.4Cass. 15 nov. 1900, Dallez 1901. 1. 137. So also Quebec grants a right of action
to vindicate the memory of ancestors. Chiniquy v. Begin, 42 Quebec Super. Ct. 261,
7 Dom. L. Rep. 65, appealed 24 Dom. L. Rep. 687 (1915).
5 GERMAN CIVIL CODE (Loewy 1909) Act. 823.6Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 259 App. Div. 928, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 315 (2d Dep't 1940).
7284 N. Y. 337, 31 N. E. (2d) 182 (1940).
sCf. Armstrong, Nrothing But Good of the Dead? supra note 2; Shepherd, Libelling
the Dead (1932) 35 LAw NOTES 224 and cases cited therein; Walton. Libel Upon the
Dead and the Bath Club Case (1927) 9 J. Comr . LEG. & INT. L. (3d Serv.) 1; De-
famina the Dead--and Vice Versa (1937) 53 Scor. L. REV. 145; Defamation of the
Dead-(1935) 89 JusT. P. 460; Note (1925) 59 I. L. J. 195.
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instant decision the plaintiffs did not sue to recover for defamation of the
memory of the deceased Jack Rose but rather proceeded upon the theory that
the statements printed were libelous as to them personally. Whether Mr.
Rose's relatives could or should as a matter of public policy collect damages
for harm to them from what, admittedly, would have been a libel upon him
if he were alive is, it seems, a collateral issue, for the suit of the plaintiffs
is not derivative. The plaintiffs claim injury to their own standing in the
community, flowing from false reports concerning a third person; and
whether that third person is or is not living is seemingly irrelevant if the
alleged libellants can prove damage to themselves and advance a reasonably
supportable theory upon which recovery can be awarded.
In the principal, case, the plaintiffs were explicitly mentioned in the news-
paper article as the surviving wife and children respectively. There is no
real question of their identification. The defendant admits that the statements
were libelous so far as they would have affected Mr. Rose were he living.
The majority, however, seizes upon the fact that, since the plaintiffs were
only incidentally referred to, no direct reflection was made upon them, and,
therefore, no recovery is to be permitted.
It is difficult to perceive why the reflection is not direct. Had the plaintiffs
been totally unassociated with the deceased, then any defamation of Mr. Rose
could hardly be said to be detrimental to the plaintiffs. But the courts have
long realized that where certain defined relationships exist between two
persons, libel or slander of the one may easily assume a damaging character
with reference to the other.9 The court speaks of other jurisdictions which
have granted relief in analogous relational cases.' 0 Professor Green classifies
these relationships as ". . . family, social, political, professional, and trade,"
maintaining that they are virtually property interests and that an impair-
ment of the interest itself may affect persons other than the immediate
target.:" Thus a husband has recovered for injury to the husband-wife re-
lationship via defamation of the wife. True, the court was of the opinion that
the sine qua non of his recovery was the right of the wife herself to collect
damages.1 2 But since it is the philosophy of a progressive legal system to
offer a remedy whenever a substantial social interest is interfered with, it
would appear inequitable to deny a cause of action to the living A for harm
suffered by him simply because the policy of precedent has seen fit to refuse
similar relief to the survivors of the deceased B for an attack upon B's repu-
tation on the controversial theory that the dead "have no rights and can
suffer no wrong."'18 Other decisions illustrate that a partnership may
9It has been held to be a libel also to write of a person that a near relative of his
was a criminal. Merrill v. Post Pub. Co., 197 Mass. 185, 83 N. E. 419 (1908). Like-
wise, a plaintiff has been granted recovery where her picture was printed in a news-
paper with the caption underneath explaining that she was attempting to rescue her
convicted father from capital punishment. Van Wiginton v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 218
Fed. 795 (C. C. A. 8th 1914). See the cases collected in Burton v. Cromwell Pub.
Co., 82 F. (2d) 154, 155 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
10 Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc., supra note 7, at 337.
"1Green, The Right of Privacy (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 237.
12 Garrison v. Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n., 207 N. Y. 1, 100 N. E. 430 (1912).
13 Reg. v. Ensor (1887) 3 T. L. R. 366.
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recover for defamatory statements directed at one of the partners,1 4 a cor-
poration for libel of one of its officials,' 5 a master for defamation of his
servant, the business being adversely affected thereby.1 6 The basis of redress
in these latter instances, furthermore, does not depend on the right of the
one immediately damaged to obtain indemnity, for the plaintiffs have been
granted independent recovery for injury to themselves or itself. Clearly, in
the principal case, the plaintiffs were in such peculiar, immediate relation
with the libellant that any injury to the latter meant a natural resultant harm
to the former since all shared alike in the "property interest" which the rela-
tionship represented. Naturally, the relationship must be close and imme-
diate, for, otherwise, innumerable collateral relatives would crowd the court-
rooms with their remote claims of injury; and the objection of multiplicity of
suits and endless litigation would then asshme rightful significance.'
7
Though the court in the instant case may have been unwilling radically
to alter New York decisions in this field, it is suggested that an injustice
,might have been avoided by permitting the plaintiffs (had they asked leave
to do so) to amend their complaints and to prove, if possible, special damages
as in the case of a libel per quod or "innuendo". This would avert the possi-
bility of spurious suits where the defamation is secondary in nature, but
at the same time afford meritorious claims proper hearing and treatment.
The suggestion of the minority, speaking through Judge Finch, that the
legislature should act on this point is well taken. In New York in recent
years, the trend in analogous actions has been to afford relief where the
common law had previously denied it. Thus, through statute the right of
privacy has been recognized to a certain degree as a result of judicial recom-
mendation by the court.'8  So also heirs have come to enjoy since 1935 a
statute providing for the survival of tort actions, other than those coming
within the Lord Campbell enactment, though the one immediately injured
has not survived the action.'9 If the public policy underlying such legisla-
14Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo. 223, 110 Pac. 181 (1910) ; Note 52 A. L. R. 912 (1928).15It is not necessary even that the allegedly libelous statements defame the official
personally, so long as they directly reflect on the corporation's soundness or business
methods. Martin County Bank v. Day, 73 Minn. 195, 75 N. W. 1115 (1898) ; Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Ass'n. v. Spectator Co., 50 Jones & S. 460 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1884).
16Morgan v. Republican Pub. Co., 249 Mass. 338, 144 N. E. 221 (1924).
17Cf. infra notes 24 and 26.
181n Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902), the
Court of Appeals refused to recognize the "right of privacy" in a case where the
plaintiff's photograph was used in an advertisement without her consent. The court
said that it was reluctant to interfere with settled principles, but it hinted at the ad-
visability of legislative action. The result was the New York Civil Rights Law § 51,
granting a cause of action for unauthorized advertising use of a person's name, por-
trait, or picture.
Experience has proved that in such instances, where the common law is modified
to adjust it to modern conditions, legislative enactment is, for two reasons, more satis-
factory than extensions by the court: (1) the statute, unlike a decision, is not retro-
active; (2) statutes which change the common law are always strictly construed. So
in the principal case, a comment of the Roberson case might well be repeated: "The
legislative body could very well interfere. . . . In such event no embarrassment would
result to the general body of the law for the rule would be applied only to cases
provided for by the statute." 171 N. Y. at 545.
19N. Y. DEc. EsT. L.A.w, Art. 4, § 119 recites: "No cause of action for injury to person
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tion is to prevent depletion of the family estate, it would appear that to
permit a cause of action in the principal case would aid in the general ful-
fillment of that public policy and recognize what the cases have long acknowl-
edged, i.e., that a family status and relationship can be impaired and depleted
in ways other than purely pecuniary ones.
2 0
II
Earnest consideration of the problem in the instant decision will demon-
strate that in many libel and slander cases similar to the principal one the
plaintiff is entitled to recovery on the ground of emotional disturbance as
well as on the basis of defamation. The last few decades have witnessed the
emergence of what the commentators have since labeled "a new tort": mental
suffering. Much has been written on the subject.21 While any appraisal of the
writers' views, however brief, is precluded because of the limitations of space,
it is significant to note that their unanimous opinion, along with that of the
American Law Institute, favors redress for injuries resulting from internal
operation of fright and shock caused by the wrongful conduct of another,
though ancillary to no self-evident physical harm. A relatively small number
of jurisdictions, including New York, continues to refuse to recognize
mental shock standing alone and permits it to be pleaded only to support
an award for special damages where the main cause for complaint is an
actual physical injury. In 1936, the New York Law Revision Commission
submitted a recommendation to the legislature which, if enacted would have
permitted recovery for fright and shock without proof of accompanying
bodily damage. 22 The bill was not reported out of committee in the Assem-
bly and was tabled in the Senate, and has since then made no further progress.
or property shall be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of
action existed. . . ." The action is brought by the executor or administrator in behalf
of the estate. Prior to the effective date of the statute (Sept. 1, 1935), death barred all
subsequent actions. N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAw, Art. 5, § 130 is the New York Lord Campbell
enactment and provides for an action by the executor or administrator where the
defendant's alleged wrongful act caused the death of the deceased.
In Walker v. Robertson, 2 Murray's Jury Trial Rep. 508 (1821), the son, as repre-
sentative, was permitted not only to continue a libel action originally brought by his
father who predeceased the conclusion of the suit but also to bring a second action in his
own right for his injuries, resulting from the libel upon his deceased parent.20See 'the leading Scotch case, Brown v. Ritchie, 6 Fraser 942 (1904), in which
recovery by the surviving relatives was denied, but the majority qualified their posi-
tion by granting that under certain circumstances the survivors' might collect damages,
namely "if the aspersion of the deceased injured status or caused pecuniary loss to the
living." (Italics added).
In the same opinion, Lord Young dissented, maintaining: "I am of the opinion
that the widow and children of a dead man whose character has been defamed are
not only interested to clear the character of the deceased but it is their duty to clear
the character and to seek solatium for the injury done to their own feelings."
See also, Ott v. Murphy, 160 Iowa 730. 141 N. W. 463 (1913) - Wright, Tort Re-
sponsibility for Destruetion of Goodwill (1929) 14 CORNELL L. Q' 298, 301.
2 1The best collection of citations to leading articles, notes and authorities will be
found in N. Y. Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65 (E) p. 74-5, n. 259. Cf. RESTATEAMNT, ToRTs
(1934) § 436.
22Act, Recommendation and Study Relathwn to Liability for Injuries Resulting from
Fright or Shock, N. Y. Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65 (E).
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Like all other minority states,2 however, New York has through numer-
ous exceptions whittled away a substantial portion of the rigid stand taken
by the Court of Appeals in Mitchell v. The Rochester Ry.24 The instant
decision would seem to fall within one of these exceptions as enumerated by
the court in Garrison v. Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n., where Chief
Judge Hiscock stated :25 "I think the rule of the cases rtferred to [the
Mitchell case and those following it] is not here applicable .... [I]t might
be said that substantial physical sufferings resulting from mere mental actions
are not a natural result of negligent conduct which generally makes itself felt
by inflicting some actual and direct physical injury. In the case of such a
wrong as that of libel and slander, however, the natural and immediate effect
in the line of results we are now discussing must be on the mind and not on
the body, and therefore such mental disturbance and its consequences even
in the shape of resulting sickness are fairly to be apprehended."
Although the Garrison case itself involves deliberate injury, the opinion
clearly intimates that the court's reasoning applies both to willful and negli-
gent defamation. It would seem that in the principal case any doubt that
may have existed in the court's mind as to the plaintiffs' recovery for negli-
gently created mental disturbance should have been resolved in their favor,
for the facts disclose that ". . . the slightest effort at verification would have
shown the falsity of the story," thereby placing the defendant's conduct in
the category of gross negligence or willful infliction of injury for which
every jurisdiction in both America and England which has spoken on the
point will grant recovery. Further, if the court required a showing of speci-
fic proof of injury within the field of medical science, it would remove all
objections to relief even in the instance of negligently caused emotional suf-
fering since only bona fide and meritorious" claims could then survive.20
It has always been a fundamental concept in our system of law that free-
dom of the press and fair comment should remain unhampered and inviolate.
But tabloid journalism has prompted both courts and legislatures to curtail
23For detailed discussion of the eight major exceptions and the position taken by
the various minority jurisdictions, cf. id. 49-74.
24151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896). The court in the Mitchell case listed four
reasons for its denial of recovery: (1) since no recovery can be had for mere fright
standing alone (occasioned by the negligence of another), no recovery can be had for a
resulting physical injury flowing from fright so caused; (2) injuries sustained through
fright caused by another's negligence cannot be considered the proximate cause of such
conduct; (3) the damages claimed are speculative; (4) a contrary rule would result
in the successful prosecution of fraudulent claims.
25207 N. Y. 1, 2, 100 N. E. 430 (1912).
261f the court were convinced that medical science permits the proof of the physical
harm as a consequence of mental suffering, it would in all probability modify its posi-
tion as stated in the Mitchell case (cf. point 1, note 24 supra). But it should be here
pointed out that in order for the court to grant recovery in the principal case, it would
necessarily have to go even further than merely permitting recovery for fright and shock
injuries. For in the principal case there was no immediate emotional disturbance
but rather gradual and prolonged mental irritation from which physical injuries might
easily result. To grant damages to the present plaintiffs would, therefore, be a very
great advance over the Mitchell case. The Restatement of Torts Section 436 is in accord
with holding the actor liable not only for immediate fright and shock but for other emo-
tional disturbances as well.
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somewhat the freedom of newspapers in order to- protect both the rights and
the privacies of the general public. It is submitted that a restriction in the
nature of granting a right of action to the surviving immediate relatives for
libel of a deceased person, upon either of the two theories above suggested,
is not unwarranted in view of the tremendous and expanding circulation and
influence of the daily press. The existence of that right would promote more
careful reporting of news as well as afford relief where the shortcomings of
the common law fail to supply it.
Louis Pollack
Securities Act of 1933: Effect of failure to register securities upon valid-
ity of ,contract to purchase.-Is an option to purchase securities unregis-
tered with the SEC illegal and void as contrary to public policy? The ques-
tion was answered in the negative by Mr. Justice McReynolds in A. C. Frost
& Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 61 Sup. Ct. 414, 85 L. ed. 383 (1942).
Petitioner was the assignee of an option for the purchase of all or any part
of 1,300,000 unregistered treasury shares of the defendant mines corporation.
After petitioner had purchased 165,000 shares defendant repudiated the
option and refused further delivery. Petitioner sued for damages.' The
Supreme Court of Idaho, finding that "all the stock offered for sale amounted
to public offerings" and that means of interstate communication and trans-
portation were used, held that failure to register rendered the contract illegal
and void as contrary to public policy.2 On appeal the United States Supreme
Court, for the purposes of the decision, accepted the Idaho court's finding
that the evidence was sufficient to show a public offering, but held that the
contract, otherwise legal and fair on its face, was not unenforceable.
'The claim for damages included those consequent upon breach of the agreement, and
for $16,306 which defendant had credited to petitioner under the terms of the contract.
The option contract, as modified in 1935, authorized defendant to sell the optioned stock
and upon sale to credit petitioner with the proceeds above the option price, i.e., ten
cents a share. Defendant had sold many shares at prices above ten cents and had given
petitioner credits amounting to $16,306.
2A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 61 Idaho 21, 98 P. (2d) 965 (1939).
The court denied all recovery, although the trial court had given judgment for the
$16,306 (see note 1). The United States Supreme Court reversed on both items,
61 Sup. Ct. 414, 85 L. Ed. 383 (1941). On the point of illegality the Idaho court
said, by Budge, 3.: "The proof rather than sustaining the burden of showing that
the transaction was exempted affirmatively shows that all the stock offered for sale
amounted to public offerings and that interstate means of communication and trans-
portation were used in connection therewith. Certainly the facts disclosed by the option
agreement itself and the so-called subsequent modification, etc., and the many letters
passing between Frost & Company and Coeur d'Alene Mines Company, recognizing that
Frost & Company was selling the treasury stock to all and sundry, directing delivery of
such treasury stock to other stock firms or brokers for sale to or by them flatly
refutes such contention. . . . It should be borne in mind that the option agreement
is void because prohibited by law. The well established rule is that if the contract
is void because prohibited by law or as against public policy the courts will leave the
parties in the identical situation in which it finds them, and the contract cannot be
treated as valid by invoking estoppel." 61 Idaho 21, 25, 27, 98 P. (2d) 965 (1939).
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The Securities Act of 1933 requires the registration of securities to be
sold to the public, granting certain exemptions based on the type of securi-
ties and the size of the offering.4 The purpose of the legislation is the pro-
tection of innocent purchasers, and the Act sets forth a standard of conduct
in the issuance and sale of securities, and also minima for disclosure to the
public. For failure to register with the SEC the Act imposes sanctions and
raises certain liabilities to purchasers of the securities. Section 55 makes it
unlawful to make use of the mails or any means of interstate transportation
or communication to effect the delivery or sale of an unregistered security or
the transmittal of an inadequate prospectus.6 Section 127 authorizes recovery
of the consideration paid where the securities are sold in violation of section
5 or, in effect, of section 11.8 A fine of not more than $5000 or imprison-
ment of not more than five years is the penalty imposed by section 249 for
willful violation of any of the provisions of the Act. Despite the use of the
term "unlawful" in section 5 and the imposition of fine or imprisonment,
the Court stresses the purpose of the Act-the protection of purchasers 0 -
and holds that the illegality which raises liabilities to purchasers and even
merits criminal penalties is not a defense to an action by one who will not be
injured by the enforcement of the contract, where such enforcement would
not be damaging to the public.
The general proposition that contracts in contravention of public policy
will not be enforced is too well settled to require citation of authority. The
Court in the Frost case points out, however, that the doctrine should be
applied only in cases plainly within the reasons upon which it rests. After
examination of the issues, and with the aid of a memorandum filed by the
SEC, ' 1 the Court concludes that voiding the option contract here would
thwart rather than aid the purpose of the legislation. The Securities Act
3 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a), 48 STAT. 75 (1933), amended 48 STAT. 906 (1934),
15 U. S. C. § 77c(a) (Supp. 1940).4Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 48 STAT. 76 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77c(b) (Supp.
1940). For comment on the recent broadening of the exemption for issues not exceed-
ing $100,000 see Note (1941) 26 CONELL L. Q. 343.
548 STAT. 77 (1933), amended 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 77e (Supp. 1940).
§ 4(1) 48 STAT. 77 (1933), amended 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 77d (1)
(Supp. 1940) provides that the provisions of § 5 shall not apply to "... transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offerings; . ."
6The requirements for the prospectus are set forth in § 10, 48 STAT. 81 (1933),
amended 48 STAT. 906 (1934) 15 U. S. C. § 77j (Supp. 1940).
748 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 771 (Supp. 1940).
8§ 11 authorizes recovery from signers of the registration statement, directors, ac-
countants, underwriters, and other specified persons in case there has been an untrue
statement of a material fact or the omission of a material fact. 48 STAT. 82 (1933),
amended 48 STAT. 907 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 77k (Supp. 1940).
948 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77x (Supp. 1940).
'0That for the purpose of deciding whether or not a civil cause of action under § 11
is assignable a court may call the civil remedy "penal" in nature rather than "reme-
dial" is to be carefully distinguished from the fact that the Act contains penal pro-
visions for the willful violation of any of the sections of the Act. See Note (1941) 26
COnRNr.L L. Q. 488, commenting on Wogahni v. Stevens, 236 W'is. 122, 294 N. W. 503
(1940), which held that the civil remedy under § 11 is penal rather than remedial.
"1A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 61 Sup. Ct. 414, 417, n. 2, 85
L. ed. 383 (1941).
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went further than merely proscribing certain activities; the legislative pur-
pose was the protection of purchasers. "They are given definite remedies
inconsistent with the idea that every contract having relation to sales of
utiregistered shares is absolutely void; and tQ accept the conclusion reached'
by the [Idaho] Supreme Court below would probably seriously hinder rather
than aid the purpose of the statute."'11 The Act contains no provision de-
claring that contracts in contemplation of a public offering of unregistered
securities are void. The Court expresses its willingness to add a sanction to
those set forth by a statute, where this would further the purpose of the
statute; but where the contrary appears, and the statute is explicit in its
remedial provisions, the Court will make no additions.
The SEC memorandum points out further that the rule of the Idaho
court is so broad that it would upset the statutory system of relief and
frustrate in many ways the purposes of the Act. Such rule, for instance,
would prevent an issuing corporation from recovering from an underwriter
and thus putting to use in its business the money invested by the public.
"[I]t would be anomalous to rest such an injury to the investors upon the
fact that the transaction in which the securities were distributed violated
the Act, which was designed to protect those investors."' 3 A court cannot
find its answer merely in whether or not certain acts have violated the
securities legislation. In each situation it must decide the issue: would en-
forcement of the obligation effectuate or frustrate the purposes of the Act?
It is not entirely clear that the parties in the instant case had.entered upon
a course of action violative of the Act, inasmuch as the Court did not pass on
the question of whether there was in fact a public offering. Even assuming,
as the Court did for the purposes of the case, that there was such an offering
and hence a violation of the Act, '4 the decision of the Court seems tin-
impeachable in enforcing the contract liability.
Harry Scott, Jr.
Wills: Legacy to attesting witness: Saving of legacy by flight from
the state.-Section 27 of the Decedent Estate Law of New York provides
that "if any person shall be a subscribing witness to the execution of any
will, wherein any beneficial devise, legacy, interest or appointment of any
real or personal estate shall be made to such witness, and such will cannot
be proved without the testimony of such witness, the said devise, legacy,
interest or appointment shall be void, so far only as concerns such witness,
or any, claiming under him; and such person shall be a competent witness,
and compellable to testify respecting the execution of the said will, in like
manner as if no such devise or bequest has been made."'
Section 27 was intended to soften the rigors of the common law that voided
12McReynolds, J., id. at 417 and 386.
13SEC memorandum, id. at 417, n. 2, and 386, n. 2.




a will if a necessary witness had any beneficial interest therein.2 At the same
time some measure of protection against fraud and undue influence was
retained by invalidating any testamentary gift to an attesting witness without
whose testimony the will could not be proved.
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals has demonstrated strikingly
the limitations of Section 27. The testatrix, by a will in her own handwriting,
bequeathed "the business of Edgar B. Walters organization to the help now
running same. . . ." The two attesting witnesses, A and B, were residents
of New York and were among the five persons whom the testatrix intended
should take under this clause. A testified at the probate proceedings and, in
accordance with Section 27, lost his legacy. B went to Connecticut for the
express purpose of avoiding testifying, and remained there until after the
will was probated. The will was probated without the testimony of B, pur-
suant to an order of the Surrogate dispensing with the testimony of B.3 No
person sought an order to compel B to give testimony to be taken out of the
state by commission. 4 At the time of distribution B came back to New York
and demanded her legacy. Held: B was entitled to take her legacy. In re
Walters Estate, 285 N. Y. 158, 33 N. E. (2d) 72 (194i1), 5 reversing a decree
of the Surrogate's Court6 which had been affirmed by the Appellate Division.7
The Surrogate was confronted with the anomalous position of penalizing A
for having dutifully testified at the probate proceedings and of rewarding B
for having evaded the same duty. "The situation is far from appealing to
2
ATKINSON, WILLS (1932) § 121. "It was the common law in England that where a
legatee or devisee named in a will became a subscribing witness to it and it could
not be probated without his testimony, the will was void. Many wills were drawn by
laymen unfamiliar with this principle and cases frequently arose where great hard-
ship was worked and the wishes of the deceased were entirely frustrated by the fact
that a devisee or legatee named therein had acted as a subscribing witness to the will
and it could not be probated without his testimony. To remedy the evils and hardships
growing out of that situation a statutz was enacted which deprived the witness of his
interest as legatee or devisee under such will, and thereby made him a competent wit-
ness. (25 GEo. II, ch. 6; 2 BLACK. Com. 377; 4 KENT. CoM. (4th ed.) 308; FOWLER'S
DECEDENT ESTATE LAw, ANN. 223). A statute to the same effect was enacted in this
state, and was held to be peremptory, and made a devise to a witness to a will void.
(Jackson v. Denniston, 4 Johns 311)." Matter of Dwyer, 192 App. Div. 72, 76, 182 N.
Y. Supp. 64, 66 (4th Dep't 1920).3 Section 142 of the Surrogate's Court Act provides that in case of death or absence
from the state, the testimony of a subscribing witness can be dispensed with and the
will can be probated upon the testimony of a single witness.,4 Section 142 of the Surrogate's Court Act, supra note 3, further provides that "where
such witness is absent from the State and it is shown that testimony can be obtained
with reasonable diligence, the Surrogate may, in his discretion, and shall upon the
demand of any party, require his testimony to be taken by commission."
5 See Note, "Effect of Attesting Witnesses' Interest Under Legacy Purging Statutes"
(1941) 50 YALE L. J. 701, disapproving the result reached by the lower courts in the
principal case. A note in (1940) 53 HARV. L. REv. 858 reaches an opposite conclusion:
"The decision can in any case be justified on the ground that it is against public policy
to permit a witness intentionally to avoid his duty to testify at the probate of a will."
6172 Misc. 207, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 8 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
TAff'd w. o. op., 259 App. Div. 1078, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 37 (2d Dep't 1940). There
is a dissent, however, by Justice Taylor in which he stresses the penal character of
Section 27 and the necessity for its strict construction.
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equity and to the conscience of this court." s The Surrogate, holding that
Section 27 could not be so easily circumvented, voided the legacy to B.
The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, 9 took the simple and satisfac-
tory position that the will had in fact been proven without the testimony of
B, and that, since Section 27 voided a gift to an attesting witness only when
"such will cannot be proved without the testimony of such witness", the sec-
tion obviously did not apply. Discounting the argument of public policy that
had so swayed the Surrogate, Chief Judge Lehman remarked, "We apply
the law as it is written."'10
Although the decision iri the principal case cannot be criticized in view of
the language of Section 27 and the meagre precedents available," it does
seem, at first glance, to open the door to a wholesale evasion of Section 27
by witnesses who are beneficially interested in the wills they have attested.
However, the Court of Appeals aptly pointed out that no person had sought
to take the testimony of B in Connecticut by commission. Upon an affidavit
by the proponent that he could not locate B, the Surrogate had issued an order
dispensing with the testimony of B. Upon his own initiative, the Surrogate
could have ordered the testimony of B to be taken by commission in Con-
necticut, and the Surrogate was required to do so if requested by an inter-
ested party. Had B remained obdurate, the penal sanctions of the Connecti-
8172 Misc. 213, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 15 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
9judge Desmond dissented on the ground that the legacy was void when made, since
A and B were then within the state, and it could not thereafter be validated by the act
of B in leaving the State. "To allow her [B] to collect her legacy would destroy the
effectiveness of Section 27 of the Decedent Estate Law and would point out a very
simple and easy means to produce the very result prohibited by the statute, the pay-
ment of a legacy to one of two subscribing witnesses whose testimony is necessary
to prove a will."
10258 N. Y. 162, 33 N. E. (2d) 74 (1941).
"lIn Cornwell v. Wooley, 3 Keyes 378, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 441 (1867), it was held
that where a subscribing witness was a non-resident of the state and the will could be
proved upon the testimony of the other subscribing witness, a legacy to the non-
resident witness was valid.
It has been held that where there are three witnesses, the witness did not forfeit his
legacy, even though he did testify at probate, since there was the requisite number of
impartial witnesses to prove the will. Matter of Owen, 48 App. Div. 507, 62 N. Y. Supp.
919 (2d Dep't 1900), affirming 26 Misc. 179, 56 N. Y. Supp. 853 (Surr. Ct. 1898). In
the Owea case the court stated that "the test established by the statute [Sec. 27] is the
provableness of the will without the testimony of a subscribing witness to whom a
legacy or devise is given. I cannot see that it matters in the least what the reason
is why the will happens to be provable without his testimony."
In Caw v. Robertson, 5 N. Y. 125 (1851), it was held that where a will is witnessed
by more than the requisite number of witnesses, all of whom are legatees under the
will, the last subscribing witness does not lose his legacy.
"It follows that if the language of Sec. 27--'cannot be proved without the testimony
of such witness'--is to be accepted as referring to the theory of proving wills, a gift
to one of the attesting witnesses is invalidated in no case. for the will can be proved
without his testimony even where he has absented himiself from the state or where he
has appeared and testified against the instrument. The conclusion seems to be that
Sec. 27 must be taken to refer to what actually has occurred, and, that the validity
of the gift to the attesting witness depends upon whether he has in fact testified and
also upon the relation of his testimony to the proof of the will." DAvID, NEw YORK
LAW OF WLLS (1924) § 588. (Italics added).
1941]
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cut law1 2 could have been invoked against her. If the facts of the case war-
ranted this prescribed procedure,'13 it could have been employed without
straining the interpretation of Section 27 by declaring a forfeiture of the
legacy.
Ralph H. German
Wills: Revocation ,clause: Quantum of evidence to prove lost will as a
revoking instrument.-The will, duly executed, in 1930, of John F. Reed,
was filed for probate. The probate was contested on the allegation that
Reed had executed a will in 1936, expressly revoking all prior wills. Reed
had had custody of the 1936 will, which could not be found. There was testi-
mony that he had intended to burn it. The lower court denied probate to the
1930 will, which made specific bequests to all the testator's children, because
it had been revoked and annulled by the will of 1936.
Neither of the two attesting, witnesses who testified to the fact of execu-
tion of the 1936 will had read it, and neither knew anything concerning its
contents. A son of the testator and his wife testified that they had read the
will and that it contained a revocatory clause. There was testimony to the
effect that the 1936 will devised three lots acquired subsequent to the execu-
tion of the 1930 will. Two witnesses testified that the testator had told them
that the 1936 will "fixed" things so that all the children would take equally.
No further evidence concerning the dispositive provisions of the instrument
was adduced. The contestants contended that all they need show was that a
subsequent will had been executed which contained a clause annulling former
wills. In Reed v. Johnson, 143 S. W. (2d) 32 (Ark. 194.), the Arkansas
Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that the burden was clearly
on the contestants to introduce evidence which clearly, positively and satis-
factorily established the entire contents of the will, or all the material parts
thereof, and that it was not sufficient to show that a subsequent will had been
executed in 1936 containing a revocatory clause, ordering the lower court
to admit the will of 1930 to probate.
The conclusion reached by the Arkansas court is supported by the dictum
of a single Pennsylvania case.' The problem presented arises from the
statutory safeguards placed about the execution, revocation, and proving of
wills. Whether the revocation of a will which itself expressly revoked a
former will "revives" the prior will is an old legal problem.2 New York
12 Section 5589 of the General Statutes of Conn. (Rev. 1930) provides for commit-
ment if a witness refuses to give testimony by deposition needed in a judicial pro-
ceeding in another state.
'3 Supra, note 4. The section provides, however, that it must be shown that the testi-
mony of the out-of-state witness is available "with reasonable diligence", and it could
be contended that no such showing was made in the principal case.
'Re Harrison, 316 Pa. 15, 173 Atl. 407, 94 A. L. R. 1019, 1024 (1934). See Rudy v.
Ulrich, 69 Pa. 177, 8 Am. Rep. 238 (1871) semble; Bates v. Hacking, 29 R. I. 1, 68
Atl. 624 (1908).
-Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W. 705 (1903) ; Ferrier, Revival of a Revoked
Will (1940) 28 CALIF. L. REV. 265; Evans, Testamentary Revival (1927) 16 Ky. L. J.
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settled that question when, in 1830, it adopted an "anti-revival" statute, now
embodied in Section 41 of the Decedent Estate Law.3 This statute has been
adopted in nearly half of the states, including Arkansas. 4  According to the
report of the New York Revisors,
"The whole statute proceeds on the principle that the hazard, that
in some cases the real intention of the deceased may be violated, and his
bounty be intercepted from the persons he designated to share it, is not
to be compared with the danger, that the claims of those whom the law
would entitle to his estate, may be defeated by fraud and perjury, if
any other than the most certain and solemn evidence of intention be
permitted to be introduced. In this country especially, we should not
hesitate to carry the principles of the statute to its full extent. We may
safely lean in favor of intestacy; since it rarely happens that the dis-
positions of a disputed will are as just and equitable as those which, in
the event of its being set aside, the law provides." 5
Under this statute the question of revival seems definitely settled. By the
consistent holdings of courts applying the statute, where the execution of a
will specifically revoking a prior will is proved, the prior will is denied
probate.0 The Arkansas court, by ordering the probate of the 1930 will after
sufficient proof of the execution of such a subsequent will had been adduced,
seems to have completely disregarded this statute.
7
The court reached its conclusion by applying the standard of proof required
by the procedural statute providing for probate of lost wills. That statute
provides that no will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will "unless its
contents be clearly and distinctly proved. ., The court cited three
47; Roberts, The Revival of a Prior by the Revocation of a Later Will (1900) 48 Am.
L. REG. (N.s.) 505. For a concise statement of the conflict between the common law
and the ecclesiastical rules, see Rudisell v. Rodes, 70 Va. 147, 149 (1877); REPORT OF
REvIsoRs OF N. Y. STATUTES OF 1827-1828, pt. II, c. IV, in 3 N. Y. REv. STAT. (2d ed.
1836) Appen. 633-634.
8"If, after making any will, the testator shall duly make and execute a second will,
cancellation or revocation of such second will shall not revive the first will, unless it
appear by the terms of such revocation that it was his intention to revive and give
effect to his first will, or unless after such destruction, cancelling or revocation he
shall duly republish his first will."4 Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1929) 14 IowA L. REv. 283, 309.
5 REPORT OF REVISORS, loc. cit. supra note 2.
6Matter of Wylie, 162 App. Div. 574, 145 N. Y. Supp. 133 (3d Dep't 1914); Matter
of Wear, 131 App. Div. 875, 116 N. Y. Supp. 304 (2d Dep't 1909) ; Matter of Barnes,
70 App. Div. 523, 75 N. Y. Supp. 373 (4th Dep't 1902); In re Fogarty's Estate, 155
Misc. 727, 281 N. Y. Supp. 577 (Surr. Ct. 1935); In re Wissman's Estate, 135 Misc.
35, 237 N. Y. Supp. 535 (Surr. Ct. 1929) ; Matter of Williams, 121 Misc. 243, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 205 (Surr. Ct. 1923); it re Forbes' Estate, 1 Pow. 590, 24 N. Y. Supp. 841
(Surr. Ct. 1893). For collection of additional cases, see Notes (1924) 28 A. L. R. 911,
921-3; (1928) 53 A. L. R. 521.7 No mention of the anti-revival statute is contained in the opinion, nor is there any
reference to its applicability.
8ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 14563. N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 143, and N. Y.
DEC. EST. LAw § 204, provide for the same measure of proof. The statute is general.
See 9 WIGORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2498; 1 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 790;
Bordwell, supra note 4, at 290 et seq.
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Arkansas cases in which this rule of evidence was applied, ignoring the fact
that in all these cases the contestants offering proof of the lost will sought
to take under its dispositive provisions.9 In the instant case no such question
was in issue. Therefore proof of the dispositive provisions would seem
irrelevant. If the second will had been revoked, or destroyed altimu's revocandi,
the statute regarding the probate of lost wills would apply in any event only
to proof of the revocation clause, since the substantive provisions of the
will could not be admitted to probate.' 0 Yet, though not admissible, or prova-
ble as a lost will, such an instrument would clearly operate as a revocation
of the prior will under the anti-revival statute."
The statute prescribing the method by which a will may be revoked also
bears on the question of evidence here involved. That statute provides that
"no will in writing ... shall be revoked or altered otherwise than by some
other will in writing or some other writing of the testator, declaring such
revocation or alteration, and executed with the same formalities with which
the will itself was required by law to be executed. .". .,1 An instrument duly
executed as a will, but inoperative as such from other circumstances (as lack
of proof of dispositive provisions), expressly revoking prior wills, would
seem to be "some other writing" within the meaning of this statute and it
has been so held. :3 The insertion of an express revocatory clause in a duly
executed instrumeut is held to be not only an expression of a purpose to
revoke the prior will but also an actual consummation of that purpose, and
the revocation is effective when the instrument is executed with the pre-
scribed formalities.. 4 The Arkansas court admitted that the execution of a
subsequent will containing an express revocatory clause was proved by
sufficient evidence, and yet refused to give effect to the revocation thereby
9Allnutt v. Wood, 176 Ark. 537, 3 S. W. (2d) 298 (1928); Rawlins v. Berry, 128
Ark. 273, 194 S. W. 249 (1917) ; Nunn v. Lynch, 73 Ark. 20, 83 S. W. 249. The rule
adduced from these cases by the court is based on the Maryland case of Rhodes v. Vin-
soa, 9 Gill & 1. 169, 171, 52 Am. Dec. 685 (Md. 1850), and was there laid down as a
rule of evidence applicable "where the object is to establish the contents of a paper
which has been destroyed, as and for a last will ... " (Italics supplied.) The Mary-
land court thirteen years later considered, in Colvin v. Warlord, 20 Md. 357, 14 Am.
Dec. 532 (1863) a case like the Arkansas case herein noted, and lucidly distinguishing
the Rhodes case, refused to require that degree of necessary proof.
' 0ln re Fogarty's Estate, 155 Misc. 727, 281 N. Y. Supp. 577 (Surr. Ct. 1935)
(revocation presumed from fact will left in testator's custody not produced) ; it re Ten
Eyck's Estate, 155 Misc. 444, 279 N. Y. Supp. 437 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
"1In re Lones, 108 Cal. 688, 41 Pac. 771 (1895) ; Matter of Kuntzl, 163 App. Div.
125, 148 N. Y. Supp. 382 (2d Dep't 1914); Collins v. Collins, 110 Ohio St. 105, 143
N. E. 561 (1924), 38 A. L. R. 230, 244 (1925).12 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 14519. Similar statutes are to be found in 33
states. Bordwell, loc. cit. supra note 4. The provisions of the New York statute
are identical with that of Arkansas. See N. Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 34.
' 3 Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332 (1857); see Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357,
14 Am. Dec. 532 (1863) ; but see Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. 177, 8 Am. Rep. 238 (1871).
The question is generally discussed by Evans, supra note 2, at 49; Note (1940) 28
Ky. L. J. 227.
' 4Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357, 14 Am. Dec. 532 (1863). But see Allen v. Beemer,
372 Ill. 295, 23 N. E. (2d) 724 (1939), for the exceptional situation in which an
express revocatory clause in a subsequent will did not revoke the prior will. The case
is noted in (1940) 28 ILL B. J. 245, 247, and (1939) 5 JOHN MARSHALL L. Q. 312.
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effected. The rule of evidence laid down by the court thereby nullified a
second substantive statute.15
In this country it has been uniformly held, without a decision to the con-
trary prior to the Arkansas case, that when proof of the execution of a
subsequent will and the presence therein of an express revocatory clause has
been supported by sufficient evidence, such proof is sufficient to establish
a revocation of a prior will.'0 Where litigants seek to establish a lost will
to take under it, both by case law and by statute the contents must be proved
by "clear and convincing proof". 17 But in such cases the propounders of the
lost will are seeking to deprive the legal heirs of the benefit of the laws of
intestacy. The policy of the courts and the legislatures in requiring a strict
measure of proof here is based on the traditional English view that the
devolution of property through intestacy is to be preferred over the doubt-
ful claims under an alleged lost will which rests entirely in parol.' s When
the alleged lost will is offered for the purpose of establishing intestacy the
policy of the court favors the propounder of the revocatory instrument, and
a less strict measure and quantum of proof is required.
It is submitted that in Reed v. Johnson the Arkansas court laid down an
unjustifiable rule of evidence, a rule that in many cases where the revoking
will is not produced or provable at probate will nullify the anti-revival statute,
and render nugatory the provisions of the statute prescribing the means and
manner in which a will may be revoked, and a rule that will prove burden-
some in future cases.
Stanley M. Browun
15 The court brushed aside the suggestion that this statute had any bearing on the
question of evidence, saying, at page 35: "We do not find anything in that section
relieving appellants from proving the contents of the subsequent will by clear, positive
and satisfactory testimony in order to annul or revoke a former will."
16Estate of Johnson, 185 Cal. 763, 198 Pac. 795 (1922); Barksdale v. Hopkins, -23
Ga. 332 (1857) ; Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357, 14 Am. Dec. 352 (1863) ; Giles v. Giles,
204 Mass. 383, 90 N. E. 595 (1910); Wallis v. Wallis, 114 Mass. 510 (1874); Dudley
v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440, 83 N. W. 97 (1900), aff'd on. rehearing, 124 Mich. 446, 86
N. W. 959 (1901); Re Cunningham, 38 Minn. 169, 36 N. W. 269 (1888); Vining v.
Hall, 40 Miss. 83 (1866) ; Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W. 705 (1903), re-
hearing denied, 68 Neb. 479, 96 N. W. 151 (1903) ; Day v. Day, 3 N. J. Eq. 549 (1831) ;
Matter of Wylie, 162 App. Div. 574, 145 N. Y. Supp. 133 (3d Dep't 1914); Matter
of Barnes, 70 App. Div. 523, 75 N. Y. Supp. 373 (4th Dep't 1902) ; It re Stege's Estate,
161 Misc. 667, 293 N. Y. Supp. 857 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; Cooley v. Cooley, 116 Misc. 157,
189 N. Y. Supp. 577 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Melhase v. Melhase, 87 Ore. 590, 171 Pac. 216
(1918) ; Brackenridge v. Roberts, 114 Tex. 418, 267 S. W. 244 (1924), re'.q 245 S. W.
786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), rehearing dended, 114 Tex. 435, 270 S. W. 1001 (1925)
1 PAcE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) §§ 791, 632, 635; 1 UNDERrILL, WILLS (1900) § 278.
179 WIGMoRE, EviDENc (3d ed. 1940) § 2498; 7 id. § 2052.
ISSee 7 WIGmoRE, EVIDENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2106; REPORT OF REVISORS, 10C. cit.
supra note 2
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